Experts: Priority is protecting Sudan’s civilians as Tasees forms police force ‘to challenge legitimacy, not pursue secession’

By Suleiman Siri for Radio Dabanga

The Sudan Founding Alliance (Tasees) government is accelerating efforts to complete its institutions and administrative structures in areas under its control as it seeks legitimacy and international recognition. Following the appointment of the remaining ministers, state ministers, undersecretaries and directors-general, the administration has now moved to establish a new police force.

The Tasees government, which is headquartered in Nyala, capital of North Darfur, has begun forming the force as part of an attempt to complete the structures of authority and governance in territories under its control and to manage public affairs there.

The Prime Minister of the Tasees government, Mohamed Hassan El Taayshi, met Interior Minister Suleiman Sandal and Police Director-General Major General Bashir Adam Issa to discuss restructuring the police force so that it reflects all regions of Sudan and achieves fair and balanced representation within the institution.

El Taayshi stressed the importance of building an independent police force free from ideological, partisan or regional loyalties. He called for a professional and neutral police service founded on respect for human rights, the rule of law, justice, integrity and transparency, while safeguarding the democratic order.

The meeting also discussed civil registry projects and the issuing of official documents and passports, as well as matters relating to criminal investigations, traffic policing, prisons and courts.

Observers say the decision to form an independent government in Nyala, together with the completion of its structures and the creation of a police force parallel to the Sudanese police aligned with the Port Sudan government, points towards a project to divide Sudan. Tasees, however, insists that it remains committed to Sudan’s unity and rejects partition.

Legitimacy of the decision

In this context, retired police Major General and security expert Malik El Hassan Abu Rof argues that the decision is legitimate and places responsibility on the opposing side, which he refers to as the “Port Sudan government”.

In an interview with Radio Dabanga, he says: “From my observation of developments since the framework agreement workshops in 2023, the military and security institutions have needed rebuilding, and the current war has confirmed this assumption.”

He believes that the “de facto government” in Port Sudan has consistently refused negotiations and the formation of a transitional government tasked with implementing agreed reforms, particularly the restructuring of the military and security apparatus.

Abu Rof says: “For this reason, the Islamic Movement has categorically rejected negotiations, which pushed the Tassis alliance to form a government aimed at stripping the de facto government of the legitimacy it claims.”

He accuses the Port Sudan authorities of denying opponents access to national identity numbers and passports, and of levelling charges punishable by death or life imprisonment against civilian political leaders.

He adds that areas controlled by Tassis forces have also been deprived of many public services, particularly those linked to the Ministry of Interior. According to senior Tassis figures, he says, the alliance remains committed to the unity of Sudan’s land and people.

Another security and military expert, who requested anonymity, stresses the importance of neutrality and independence in any national law enforcement body and highlights the need for accountability and oversight mechanisms.

The retired police officer tells Radio Dabanga: “It is extremely difficult to safeguard fundamental rights during war and instability, especially in the absence or weakness of the law. The protection of civilians becomes the overriding priority during conflict, but this requires strong leadership capable of exerting real control over forces on the ground.”

A policy of imposing a fait accompli

Retired police Major General Dr Issam Abbas, an information technology and data analysis consultant, argues that the authority led by the Rapid Support Forces is seeking to gain political and administrative legitimacy by creating institutions parallel to the state in an attempt to impose a fait accompli. Among these efforts, he says, is the creation of a separate police body.

In an interview with Radio Dabanga, Abbas says: “This step raises complex questions concerning the nature of the proposed police institution, the limits of authority under the current conflict, and the risks of militarising civilian space, rather than simply the right of any authority to establish administrative bodies.”

Abbas identifies three main concerns. The first is the challenge of building a police force in the absence of institutional transformation. He argues that there is currently no coherent institutional structure or administrative vision for governance in areas controlled by the RSF.

He notes that the police are fundamentally a civilian institution whose core function is to protect society, enforce the law and provide daily services to citizens. For this role to succeed, he says, there must be a stable political and legal environment, an independent judiciary capable of oversight and accountability, and a professional doctrine separating military from police work.

According to Abbas, the core problem with the Tasees authority lies not simply in establishing a police force, but in the nature of the body itself and its relationship to the military force behind it.

“The security imposed by RSF forces in areas under their control is fundamentally based on military deterrence and armed domination, rather than civilian security grounded in public service and the rule of law,” he says.

He warns that the real danger is that the proposed police force could become merely a civilian façade for a military power, without genuine institutional restructuring to guarantee independence, professionalism and legal accountability.

“These are conditions that are impossible to guarantee in the reality we see in Nyala and other RSF-controlled areas,” Abbas says. “There is no genuine institution capable of ensuring the independence and professionalism of such a police force or subjecting it to legal accountability.”

Parallel sovereign institutions

Abbas says the second concern lies in the risks of creating sovereign institutions parallel to the state, dealing with matters that affect the country as a whole rather than a single region.

“The danger increases when the role of the police extends into sovereign areas such as migration control, management of foreign residents and identity registration,” he says. “These are responsibilities traditionally linked to a unified central state exercising sovereign authority.”

While de facto authorities in conflict zones may sometimes be forced to manage civilian affairs out of necessity, Abbas argues that moving from temporary administration to building parallel sovereign institutions carries major political risks because it entrenches a separate institutional reality that may later prove difficult to reverse.

“We speak constantly about the unity of Sudan and call, as part of civil society concerned with the Sudanese crisis, for an end to the war and a comprehensive humanitarian process for reparations,” he says. “We also insist that no arrangements should be made that threaten Sudan’s unity.”

He warns that if the proposed police force assumes sovereign functions linked to Sudan’s identity and unity, the step could pose a direct threat to national cohesion and may become impossible to undo in future.

Abbas argues that the problem does not necessarily mean that establishing a police force constitutes a fully developed secessionist project. Rather, the multiplication of sovereign institutions outside the framework of the national state accelerates the fragmentation of central authority and deepens political and administrative divisions within the country.

Accountability amid ongoing violations

The third issue, according to Abbas, concerns trust and accountability in the context of continuing abuses.

He says any police force derives legitimacy from its ability to protect rights and submit to legal oversight. “But this condition becomes highly questionable when the body establishing the force is itself accused of documented violations, including arbitrary detention, extortion and mistreatment of detainees, in addition to a well-established and documented record of war crimes.”

In the absence of independent mechanisms for investigation and accountability, Abbas says a central question remains unavoidable: “How can a force accused of grave abuses become the very body entrusted with enforcing the law and protecting citizens?”

He warns that the danger extends beyond moral contradiction to the possibility that the same practices could simply be reproduced under a new institutional cover, thereby undermining public trust in any police force established under such conditions.

Abbas concludes that the fundamental problem is not the principle of establishing civilian institutions in conflict zones in itself, but rather the nature of those institutions, the extent of their independence, their relationship to military power, and the absence of legal and political guarantees preventing them from becoming tools for entrenching authoritarian rule.

He says any attempt to build a police force amid war and division risks becoming an extension of the crisis rather than a genuine path towards resolving it.