Blue Nile: From the margins to the centre of Sudan’s war

The Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) has stated that the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) decision to push the battle to the Blue Nile is crucially aimed at reigniting the competition for control of central Sudan – Khartoum, Sennar, and Gezira. If the RSF seize the Blue Nile, it will open routes towards Sennar, which has been under the control of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) since early 2015.

On Sunday, the RSF and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N) forces led by Abdelaziz El Hilu launched an attack on the areas of Maklan and El Silak western Blue Nile state, but the SAF said they repelled the attack. The attack displaced hundreds of residents of the El Silak area, creating dire humanitarian conditions.

The ACLED Project explained that the recent attack, in which forces crossed from South Sudan, places the Blue Nile region at the centre of the Sudanese conflict.

 The report explained that if the RSF were to gain control of the Blue Nile region, it could open a gateway to central Sudan. However, the mass mobilisation of Sudanese army forces in central Sudan over the past two years presents significant complications to any RSF efforts to replicate their earlier successes at the start of the Sudanese conflict.

Background of the attack

The Baw locality lies between the state capital, Damazin, and the Kurmuk region, which includes the Yabus area, a stronghold of the SPLM-N led by El Hilu, and borders South Sudan. These attacks mark the first direct confrontation between the two groups since the SAF accused the RSF in recent months of using neighbouring countries, particularly Ethiopia, to train and mobilise fighters.

The SAF, RSF, and allied groups have increased their deployment in Blue Nile state since at least mid-December 2015, when the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N) publicly accused Ethiopia of providing military support to the RSF. The latest campaign in Blue Nile began in earnest on January 11, when the Sudanese Air Force (SAF) conducted airstrikes on a convoy in Yabus, killing an unspecified number of people. The SAF claimed the convoy was carrying foreign mercenaries trained in Ethiopia to reinforce the RSF and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N). The SPLM-N countered that the strike killed civilians returning from markets and workplaces. Airstrikes by the SAF continued on January 22 in the Yabus and Bilel areas.

Blue Nile state is central to the push of the new RSF towards central Sudan.

From the margins to the centre

Blue Nile state was previously on the periphery of the war, but it has become a focal point in the Sudanese conflict. The current campaign by the RSF and the SPLM-N (El Hilu faction) is likely a reaction to recent offensive operations by the SAF against the two groups in North and South Kordofan, creating another front in the conflict with the SAF.

Since December 2025, airstrikes and drone attacks in South Kordofan—the main stronghold of the SPLM-N led by Abdelaziz El Hilu—have quadrupled, while the conflict for control of North Kordofan continues. Since the beginning of this year, the SAF have recaptured at least twelve locations in South and North Kordofan. Meanwhile, since February 2025, the RSF and the SPLM-N have besieged two major cities in South Kordofan: Kadugli—the state capital—and Dilling. The SAF managed to break the siege of Dilling two days ago. The SAF has been attempting to break the siege and link these cities to North Kordofan. Until the first quarter of 2025, the RSF controlled central Sudan, having previously forced the SAF-led government out of the capital, Khartoum, and relocated to Port Sudan. However, a series of RSF attacks between September 2024 and May 2025 brought about a dramatic shift, and the RSF completed its takeover of central Sudan by May 2025. The SAF subsequently re-established their government headquarters in Khartoum on January 11, 2026