Sudanese Journalists Syndicate head: ‘Three scenarios await Sudan in 2026’

The Secretary-General of the Sudanese Journalists Syndicate, Mohamed Abdelaziz, says that he is not very optimistic about the outcomes and conditions of Sudan in 2026, in light of the complexities of the internal scene and the overlap of regional and international developments, noting that the country is facing dangerous scenarios if the war continues without a clear horizon for a solution.

Abdelaziz’s remarks come as part of Radio Dabanga’s surveys on Sudanese people’s expectations for 2026, and whether it will witness the continuation of the war or the achievement of peace, where Abdelaziz presents a forward-looking reading of three possible scenarios for the outcomes of the conflict.

Scenario 1

He explains that the first scenario is a state of military stalemate or what he describes as “regional entrenchment,” where the army strengthens its control over the north, east and centre, while the Rapid Support Forces consolidate their influence over the western region and Kordofan region, leading to a de facto division of influence in which the country is run through parallel control centres without a military resolution.

Scenario Two

The second scenario relates to a political process that begins with a ceasefire as a prelude to a broader path. Abdelaziz considers it the least costly and the best for the Sudanese, but he stresses that this path remains contingent on a number of internal and external arrangements, warning that the continuation of the battles strengthens the networks of interests among the warring parties, and makes making radical decisions to end the conflict more difficult over time.

Scenario 3

While describing the third scenario as the worst, he says it is based on disintegration and fragmentation, with the rising influence of what he calls “small guns” of militias fighting alongside one side or the other, imposing their own agenda, which limits the ability of the central leadership of the army or the Rapid Support Forces to control the scene or oppose these forces.

In concluding his remarks, Abdelaziz points out that the April 15 war broke out in the same centre, which historically possessed the economic and political capacity to manage peripheral conflicts by buying loyalties or containing influence. However, this war led to the “fragmentation of the centre,” and there was no longer a single strong centre capable of subduing these armed groups.

He warns that the continuation of this situation could lead Sudan to a scenario similar to what happened in Somalia, based on multiple areas of control among “warlords,” meaning the division of the country into several spheres of influence, not just two as some imagine, which puts the future of peace in Sudan in grave danger during the coming year.