



# General Assembly

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## Human Rights Council

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Agenda item 2

**Annual report of the United Nations High Commissioner  
for Human Rights and reports of the Office of the  
High Commissioner and the Secretary-General**

### **Joint written statement submitted by African Centre for Democracy and Human Rights Studies, Centre d'études juridiques africaines (CEJA), non-governmental organizations in special consultative status\***

The Secretary-General has received the following written statement, which is circulated in accordance with Economic and Social Council resolution 1996/31.

[24 May 2026]

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\* Issued as received, in the language of submission only.



## Situation of Human Rights in the Sudan

The sponsors of this written statement welcome the Joint Declaration on the Sudan which was adopted in Banjul (The Gambia) on 12 May 2026 by the Joint Fact-Finding Mission of the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Human Rights Situation in the Sudan and the United Nations Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan (FFM).

We particularly welcome the decision of the two Fact-Finding Missions to place their work within the framework of the Addis Ababa Roadmap and their respective mandates. We believe that the comparative advantage of the work of these Missions over other similar mechanisms of the past, rests on their ability to fully exercise their mandates which consist: “... inter alia of investigating and establishing the facts, circumstances and root causes of the violations and abuses of international human rights law, as well as violations of international humanitarian law committed in the context of the armed conflict in the Republic of the Sudan, with a view to contributing to accountability and the protection of civilians.”<sup>(1)</sup>

We are gravely concerned that the two fact-Finding Missions could not visit the Sudan so far. Also of concern is that some of the Sudan's neighbouring countries that host important Sudanese refugee communities are yet to allow the Missions access to their territories in order to meet with these communities. In this regard we highly appreciate the acceptance of the governments of Chad, Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia and South Sudan to allow the FFM to visit their territories and call on them to continue their full cooperation with the two Fact-Finding Missions and support their work in the exercise of their respective mandates.

While we value the important work realized by the FFM, as contained in its comprehensive reports A/HRC/57/23 of 6 September 2024 and A/HRC/60/22 of 5 September 2025 as well as its recent report of 19 February 2026 (A/HRC/61/77) entitled “Sudan: Hallmarks of Genocide in El-Fasher” we remain appalled by the grave human rights violations and the atrocious acts documented in these reports. The FFM's findings clearly demonstrate the importance of its work as the sole internationally recognised independent mechanism in charge of scrutiny and reporting about the human rights practices and the overall situation in Sudan. These efforts command the continuation of the FFM's mandate for ample time.

However, below are some recent developments that require keen attention of the FFM namely:

1. Accusation against the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) about the use of chemical weapons in the context of the ongoing armed confrontations with the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). In this respect, we draw attention that in June 2025, the governments of Chad, Benin and Mauritania supported by Guinea-Bissau, seized the Executive Council of the state parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction (CWC) requesting clarifications from the Sudan regarding these accusations.<sup>(2)</sup> In Press Release No 25/74 of 10th July 2025 issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, Office of the Spokesperson and Media Directorate, the Sudan committed itself to address these accusations with seriousness and transparency. However, the Sudan is yet to announce the findings of the National Committee it has established on 29 May 2025 to investigate the use of chemical weapons.<sup>(3)</sup> We believe that the response of the Sudan to the request for clarification as mentioned above fell short of providing any sufficiently substantiated answers regarding such serious allegations and, therefore, there are doubts about its compliance with the provisions of CWC.

2. The economic cost of the armed conflict in the Sudan is very important and the loss in infrastructure and industrial production capacity is expected to hinder the country's efforts for post-war recovery for a long period. Unlike other contemporary internal armed conflicts in Africa, the war in the Sudan is unique in the sense that the country became the scene of a massive campaign of plunder of economic resources, destruction of infrastructure and widespread looting of private and public properties. In the words of the Chief of Mission to the Sudan of the International Organization for Migration (IOM): “There has been targeting of not only people's houses, but administrative areas, not military areas, but all the basic infrastructure that can maintain lives for people” and he added that: “Electricity stations have

been looted; the water pipes have been destroyed. And I'm not talking about some areas. I'm talking about everywhere I went.” (4)

3. A campaign of forced evictions and demolition of homes and traditional marketplaces is currently taking place in the Sudan's capital Khartoum and its twin cities viz., Khartoum North and Omdurman since May 2025. It has intensified in recent months and reached its peak in early 2026. This government-sponsored operation caused a humanitarian crisis of special significance as it affects millions of poor people in urban areas that do not witness military confrontations and are relatively safe at present. Hundreds of thousands of people, including both civilians and military personnel lost their homes as entire neighbourhoods, considered by the authorities as informal housing associated with security threats and negative social phenomena, (5) were demolished and their residents forcibly evicted, without compensation or alternative accommodation and shelter.

4. The forced evictions campaign is ethnically motivated as it targets specific communities from the Greater Darfur and Kordofan States. The campaign comes at a time of extreme insecurity and socio-economic hardships and amidst a vicious cycle of hate speech, warmongering and incriminating rhetoric from local government officials who consider the matter as no longer about urban planning, but rather it is an operation to combat crime.(6) The victims of the forced evictions complained about the denigrating racial slurs meted out to them by the security forces during the operations and that they are arbitrarily and collectively accused of being the “human incubators” of the RSF or falsely blamed of sympathising or collaborating with them during their occupation of Khartoum from 15 April 2023 to March 2025.

In conclusion, we wish to make the following two observations regarding the limited timeframe and scope of analysis of the situation which characterized the work of the FFM so far:

1 On the timeframe, we recommend extension of the mandate of the FFM for sufficient time and at least two years. The Mission's work will not be complete without visiting the Sudan and the holdout neighbouring countries, which host millions of Sudanese refugees. In this respect, we encourage members of the Human Rights Council to continue their efforts and ensure that the AU Peace and Security Council extends the necessary diplomatic and political backing so that the Sudan and neighbouring African countries allow the mission to visit their territory.

2 On the scope of work, we believe that the FFM needs to dig deep into the root causes of armed conflicts in the Sudan in order to establish the facts and circumstances and address fundamental questions: why has the Sudan been at war with itself for so long? What is the role and effects of the Sudan's experience with slavery and the 65-year long colonial rule under the Ottoman Empire and the 58-year long condominium colonial rule in the current situation. The legacy left behind by these historical phenomena, which haunts the country today without being addressed, rears its head in the subtle yet omnipresent, ethnic discrimination, social stratification as well as the political, economic and social exclusion, which underpin armed conflicts and need to be adequately investigated in order to make proper recommendations.

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Sudan Knowledge Centre, NGO(s) without consultative status, also share the views expressed in this statement.

(1) Joint Declaration on Sudan - Adopted by the Joint Fact-Finding Mission of the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Human Rights Situation in the Sudan and the United Nations Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan, 12 May 2026, <https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2026/05/joint-declaration-sudan-adopted-joint-fact-finding-mission-african>

(2) Opening Statement by the Director General of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons to the 109th Session of the Executive Council, EC-109/DG.25 dated 8 July 2025, paragraph 30, page 6, <https://www.opcw.org/sites/default/files/documents/2025/07/ec109dg25%28e%29.pdf>

- (3) Sudan asks U.S. for evidence on chemical weapons claim, SudanTribune, 10 July 2025, <https://sudantribune.com/article/302736>
- (4) Mohamed Refaat, IOM's Chief of Mission in Sudan, Sudan: Suffering continues amid massive destruction across Khartoum, UN News, Global perspective Human stories, 4 April 2025, <https://news.un.org/en/story/2025/04/1161876>
- (5) No Shelter After War: The Demolition of Khartoum and Al-Jazirah's Informal Settlements, Atar, Sudan in Perspective, 18 August 2025, <https://atarnetwork.com/?p=14506>
- (6) Ibid