Towards a Sustainable Political Transformation in Sudan: Elements of a Roadmap

Expert Advisory Group
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Abbreviations and Acronyms

AIDS  Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
ARV   Antiretroviral
CPI   Corruption Perception Index
DDR   Demobilization, Disarmament and Re-integration
EU    European Union
FSI   Failed States Index
GCC   Gulf Cooperation Council
GDP   Gross Domestic Product
GoS   Government of Sudan
HCF   Healthcare Financing
HDI   Human Development Index
HIV   Human Immunodeficiency Virus
HRH   Human Resources for Health
HTP   Health Technologies and Pharmaceuticals Programme
JIU   Joint Integrated Units
ICC   International Criminal Court
ILO   International Labor Organization
IMF   International Monetary Fund
MFA   Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MOE   Ministry of Education
MoFNE Ministry of Finance and National Economy
MOH   Ministry of Health
NCP   National Congress Party
NISS  National Intelligence and Security Service
NIF   National Islamic Front
ODA   Official Development Assistance
PDF   Popular Defense Force
PHC   Primary Health Care
PPP   Purchasing Power Parity
PR    Proportional Representation
PSF   Popular Security Force
RSF   Rapid Support Forces
SAF   Sudan Armed Forces
SAPs  Structural Adjustment Programs
SMP   Staff Monitored Programs
SPLA-N Sudan People’s Liberation Army - North
SRF   Sudan Revolutionary Front
TGoS  Transitional Government of Sudan
UN    United Nations
UN DESA United Nations Department for Economic and Social Affairs
UNDP  United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
WHO  World Health Organization
Preface: Towards a New Dispensation

The continuous failure to create a national consensus on a nation-building project has entailed calamitous situations throughout the country since Sudan’s independence in 1956. A new social, economic, political and cultural dispensation is required to stop the downward descent of the country into chaos and fragmentation; especially after the cessation of South Sudan in 2011 and because of the ongoing genocide and war crimes in Darfur, the Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile. In addition, the economic collapse, deteriorating living conditions, violations of human rights, lack of freedoms and rule of law, injustice, non-inclusive development and governance, and massive corruption have made it clear to the Sudanese people that a paradigm shift from the old policies is necessary and a blueprint to take the country in a new direction is needed.

A group of Sudanese met at Harvard University in April 2012 to discuss this very challenge. The meeting inspired the SPLM-N to commission a number of Sudanese professionals from different intellectual backgrounds to research and write a document that, if implemented, could provide such a blueprint. These Sudanese professionals established the Expert Advisory Group (EAG), recognizing that the Sudanese academic community and Sudanese thinkers and intellectuals have a major role to play in contributing their expertise to Sudan’s political life. EAG reached out to a wide group of Sudanese experts in the areas of constitutional law, civil and human rights, governance, foreign policy, security, social and economic development, and culture and identity. EAG includes experts and Sudanese thinkers from the marginalized areas and the center who are working together to plan a new future for Sudan and have contributed equally to the outcome. This pooling of talent from all over the country reflects the diversity of Sudan.

The enclosed document represents countless hours of research and discussion by Sudanese who were tasked with providing a succinct summary of the status quo, identifying why change is needed, and prescribing interventions, from an institutional perspective, that included estimates of the time horizon and anticipated costs. Sudan must arrive at equality in citizenship rights and at restructuring of the state in the interests of the majority of the population that includes good governance and providing basic services like clean water, education and health to its citizens.

The enclosed program is designed to pursue the vision of a New Sudan for the benefit of all Sudanese, but especially for the poor and marginalized of Sudan. It is meant to end our suffering and to usher us into a new social, economic, political, and cultural dispensation that will change our lives and will provide equal citizenship, sustainable development and democracy, especially for women, children and youth. This program also promotes peaceful relations, cooperation and integration with our regional neighbors as wells as enhancing global peace and stability. There is a special emphasis on strategic relations between the two independent states of Sudan and South Sudan.
EAG is continuing its consultations with the SPLM-N and other opposition and civil society groups to develop its program further to meet the needs of the Sudanese people and to build a think tank to continue our joint work. The experience of this project has shown that joint work between the EAG and political forces and civil society groups within the country can provide informed policies that will serve the future of our country. Although some women have contributed to this document, EAG recognizes that greater contribution by women is imperative in order to arrive at a genuinely new dispensation.

The Secretariat of the Expert Advisory Group would like to sincerely thank all those who contributed to this effort for the last four years and those who attended the retreats in Helsinki, Paris, Cape Town and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, namely El-Atta Hassan El-Battahani, Anwar Elhaj, Elnour Hamad, Ibrahim Taha Ayoub, Kamal Elgizouli, Malik Agar Eyre Nganyoufa, Mustafa Sharif, Nasredeen Abdulbari, Professor Mohamed Ibrahim Khalil, Rashid Saeed Yagoub, Yasir Arman and many others. A special thanks goes to those who have requested not to be identified publicly, especially those who made valuable contributions from inside Sudan and to the Director of this project, without whose tireless efforts and talent it would have been difficult to bring the work to completion. Moreover, we would like to extend our warm thanks for some non-Sudanese friends for their support of this project and to those who built the capacity of EAG’s Secretariat.

This document provides alternative policies for the day after and it is presented to the people of Sudan for further debate and development as we continue our work together to achieve democracy, justice, equal citizenship, freedom, peace and prosperity for all Sudanese.
Executive Summary

1. Currently, Sudan is a poor fragile state handicapped by a ruling party riddled with corruption and guided by a narrow view of national identity that has yielded decades of internal conflict and resulted in state failure, characterized by the lack of credible institutions, massive debt, and widespread insecurity, displacement and poverty.

2. This document does not attempt to prescribe a process for regime change. Instead, it identifies the issues plaguing Sudan and makes recommendations for correcting the state upon the anticipated change in government. These corrections aim to create a country based on justice, equality, freedom, peace and prosperity for all, regardless of race, ethnicity, religion, gender, regional location or any other aspect of identity.

3. First and foremost, resolving and accommodating the issue of identity is a prerequisite to effective nation building, a process that will be supported and reinforced through a wide and inclusive constitutional process. It is anticipated that the constitution will provide for a decentralized government; and regional autonomy, mechanisms for adequate regional representation, and adequate checks and balances on executive action affecting regions. In addition, the constitution will include safeguards guaranteeing non-discrimination, religious and cultural freedoms and rights; political accountability, including accountability for the wrongs committed by the current regime; and respect for the rule of law and independence of the judiciary.

4. Necessary institutional reforms to reverse years of politicization by the current regime will involve the civil service, the judiciary, and the security sector. Economic recovery and poverty reduction will require programming and planning by the government to rationally and consistently develop and coordinate allocation of national resources for the benefit of the Sudanese people. These efforts will require sufficient time to develop, organize and implement. Such time duration is expected to be commensurate with the damage caused to Sudanese society by the current regime. A minimum transitional period of 4 years may be sufficient to undertake some of the major interventions required.

5. Sudanese people from all walks of life, over the past two and half decades, have pondered the calamities that befell their country under the current regime and have expressed their views on the issues discussed in this document by various means. As such, this document is but one contribution in the endeavor towards creating a viable modern state in the Sudan and should serve to facilitate reaching consensus on the critical issues required for change and a just and lasting peace.
I. Introduction and Background:

6. This document is based on the twin assumptions that change is underway in Sudan, and that the parties currently in opposition to the current ruling regime subscribe fully to the principles, values and approaches expressed therein. Needless to note that the document itself will be made available for wide ranging consultations and deliberations. The current ruling regime itself will sometimes be referred to as the Inqaz regime, which is essentially a military regime that usurped political power in a military coup d’etat on the 30th of June 1989.\(^1\) The military coup was undertaken on behalf of the Sudanese Islamic Movement, at the time represented by a political party (National Islamic Front, NIF) in a democratically elected parliament.\(^2\)

7. The ultimate objective of effecting a sustainable political transformation in the country is to create a country based on justice, equality, freedom, peace and prosperity for all, regardless of race, ethnicity, religion, gender, regional location or any other aspect of identity. In this respect it is fully recognized that such a process will require not only a new system of government and a new leadership, but it will need to address the root causes of the multiple crises from which the country has suffered since its independence from colonial rule in 1956, and from which it continues to suffer following the independence of South Sudan on the 9th of July 2011.

8. In contemplating a process of change for a country, a required starting point that suggests itself is to take stock of the initial conditions of the country in question. The most relevant initial conditions include: area and population, level of development, and the nature of the state. These conditions are discussed, albeit briefly, in Section II. Section III offers a conceptual framework suitable for dealing with the issue of sustainable political transformation. In Section IV, we discuss broad outlines for modalities dealing with sustainable transformation. The details of some of the major programs and policies, gleaned from the background papers, are presented in Appendix C.

1.2. Initial Conditions

9. The area of Sudan is approximately 1.9 million squared kilometers,\(^3\) and its total population was about 40 million persons in 2015 (growing at an annual

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\(^1\) Inqaz is an Arabic word which could be translated as salvation. No specialized system of transliteration is followed in this document.

\(^2\) For a highly informative account of the role of Islam in the politics of Sudan see: Sidahmed, A.S., (1997), Politics and Islam in Contemporary Sudan; Cruzon Press, London.

\(^3\) The exact area is 1,844,797 kilometers.
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rate of 2.2 percent). About 47.1% are children under the age of 18 years, and about 14.8% are under the age of 5 years. From administrative, and governance perspectives, the country is a federal entity composed of 18 states, following the recent break-up of the Darfur region into five states (instead of three) and the Kordofan region into three, instead of two states. Five of these states, representing about 36% of the total area of the country, are still mired in civil conflicts.

10. Regarding the level of development, judged by per capita gross national income, the country is classified among the lower middle income category by the World Bank (with a per capita Gross Domestic Product [GDP] in 2015 of US$2,381). However, judging the level of development by the Human Development Index (HDI), the country belongs to the low human development category ranking in 165th place (out of 186 countries), with an HDI of 0.49. Thus, the country remains poor. Recalling the components of the HDI, the country suffers from deprivation in education (expected years of schooling of 7.3 years and mean years of schooling of 3.5 years) and health (life expectancy at birth of 63.7 years).

11. Judging the level of development by the international standing of a country in terms of foreign debt, the Sudan is a highly indebted country. According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), “Sudan’s external debt remained high as of end of 2015. In nominal terms, it amounted to about US$50 billion (61 percent of GDP)... About 84 percent of the external debt was in arrears in 2015... Sudan’s external stock remains unsustainable. (And) all external debt level ratios continue to breach their indicative thresholds throughout the 20-year projection period.”

12. Regarding the nature of the state, it has already been noted that the country is classified internationally as a fragile state. Despite wide ranging reservations about the concept of a fragile state, there is general understanding that what is meant is a state perceived as having failed at some of the basic responsibilities of a sovereign government. Whatever the definition, it is known that the Fund for Peace has developed a methodology

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5 See www.statoids.com “States of Sudan”; accessed on 4th September 2017. A state in Sudan is called in Arabic Wilayia. The recent break-up of Darfur and Kordofan is not unrelated to the nature of the ruling regime! The States in alphabetical order are Blue Nile (a conflict state), Central Darfur (a conflict state), East Darfur (a conflict state), Gedaref, Kassala, Khartoum (national capital territory), North Darfur (a conflict state), Northern, North Kordofan, Red Sea, River Nile, Sennar, South Darfur (a conflict state), South Kordofan (a conflict state), West Darfur (a conflict state), and White Nile.


to compile an aggregative Failed States Index (FSI), which is widely used for ranking countries, and for policy purposes.\(^8\) In this respect, it may be instructive to recall that “the FSI scores are sums of scores for twelve indicators related to state stability and strength. Each is scored between 0 and 10, with a higher number indicating a higher level of fragility. Indicators are divided into three categories – social, economic, and political.” Thus, the total score for FSI is 120.\(^9\)

13. The social category includes **four** major components: demographic pressures, refugees and internally displaced, group grievances, and human flight and brain drain. The economic category includes **two** components: uneven economic development and poverty and economic decline. The political and military category includes **six** components: state legitimacy, public services, human rights and rule of law, security apparatus, fractionalized elites, and external intervention.

14. In 2017, the FSI for Sudan is 110.6, placing the country as the 5\(^{th}\) most fragile state in the world, ranking in 5\(^{th}\) bottom place out of 178 countries for which the index was calculated. The worst country is South Sudan (FSI 113.9). The Sudan scored maximum points (meaning poor state of affairs) in one indicator, namely “refugees and internally displaced”; and less than 8.0 in the indicator of “uneven economic development.” For the remaining 10 indicators, the scores ranged from a minimum of 8.5 (for the indicator “poverty and economic decline”) to a maximum of 9.8 (for two indicators, “state legitimacy” and “human rights and rule of law”). Over the period since 2012, the FSI increased from 109.4 to 110.6, despite the improvement in the ranking.

15. Consistent with the above FSI classification, Sudan is also classified as one of the bottom billion countries. These are 58 developing countries (with a total population of about a billion people) that occupy the bottom of the global economic system.\(^{10}\) They are the poorest in the world because they have failed to grow in economic terms over a long period of time (e.g. since independence). They failed to grow because they got caught in one or another of four development traps: a conflict trap; a natural resources trap; a bad neighborhood trap; and a governance trap.

16. Irrespective of the FSI and for analytical purposes, it can be accepted that state fragility means the failure of public institutions to deliver a range of political goods to citizens on a scale likely to undermine the legitimacy of the

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\(^8\) See [www.ffp.statesindex.org](http://www.ffp.statesindex.org).


\(^{10}\) See Collier, P., (2007), The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries are Failing and What Can Be Done About It; Oxford University Press, New York.
state itself. Political goods involved include: security, a credible legal system, a functioning infrastructural system, relevant social welfare arrangements, and opportunities for participation in the political process. The legitimacy of the state is also undermined by widespread corruption, a characteristic feature of the current regime in the context of its overall exclusivist strategy of Islamic “tamkeen”, meaning the economic empowerment of members of the Sudanese Islamic movement. The latest international Corruption Perception Index (CPI) for 2016 reports a CPI 14 (out of 100; the higher the cleaner), ranking the country in 170th place out of 176 countries for which the index is reported. The most corrupt country was Somalia with a CPI of 10.

1.3. A Brief Conceptual Anchor

17. In the societies of the bottom billion, it is noted that “the dominant route to power has been violence. Political violence is both a curse itself and an obstacle to accountable and legitimate government...where power rests on violence, it invites an arrogant assumption that government is there to rule rather than to serve.” From a purely economic perspective, the fundamental problem of these societies is that the typical one is at the same time too diverse to be a nation (i.e. to have a common identity), and too small to be a state (i.e. to provide security to its citizens). “If the problem is that societies are too large to have an inherited sense of common identity, state building is not about institutions. There is a prior essential stage of nation building that takes visionary leadership” to forge it.

18. It is generally acknowledged that the process of building nations is time consuming and is non-linear, subject as it is to twists and turns. As a result, building institutions for sustainable political transformation could help during a transition phase, and is tantamount, for all intents and purposes, to building a Sudanese nation anew. Recent scholarship, basing itself on a very long history of human societies, suggests that in the context of developing countries, such a process involves changes in three types of superstructural institutions: the state itself “which concentrates and deploys power to enforce rules across a territory; the rule of law, which limits governments’ ability to make arbitrary decisions; and mechanisms of democratic

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12 See, https://www.transparency.org/

13 See, for example, Collier, P., (2009), Wars, Guns and Votes: Democracy in Dangerous Places; HarperCollins Publishers; New York; p. 1. Large and small are to be understood in terms of national income not in terms of population. In economic terms “security” is classified as a public good, usually provided by the state, in contrast to private goods supplied by the market.

14 P. Collier (2009: p. 9; mentioned in footnote 11).
accountability, which ensure that governments reflect the will of the people.”

These overarching institutions define a modern state as distinct from a neo-patrimonial state.

19. Given the centrality of the super-structural institutions, it is now widely agreed that, from a long-run perspective, achieving development depends crucially on the nature of political institutions that a society agrees upon to regulate the interactive relationships between its individuals in all walks of life. For developing countries, an acceptable and broad definition of institutions is that they are “a set of humanly devised behavioral rules that govern and shape the interactions of human beings, in part by helping them to form expectations of what other people will do.” Political institutions, it is suggested, could be classified in two types: inclusive political institutions and exclusive ones. Over the long sweep of history there is evidence to suggest that inclusive political institutions give rise to efficient economic institutions that eventually achieve economic and social development and economic prosperity. Exclusive political institutions, on the other hand, give birth to extractive economic institutions that eventually fail to achieve development.17 The current ruling regime provides an excellent example of an exclusive political regime which gave rise to a predatory economic system!

20. Without necessarily subscribing fully to the results of the specialized literature on institutions and development, the definition of the envisaged future Sudan raises the issue of which institutions matter? An answer to this question, in the context of developing countries, lists the following five major institutions (appropriately formulated to fit country contexts): property rights; regularity institutions; institutions for the management of the development process; institutions for social insurance; and, institutions of conflict management.18 In the process of discussing how these quality institutions are acquired, a strong case was made for participatory governance regimes for delivery of high quality economic development and prosperity. However, caution needs to be exercised in the case of fragile states and countries emerging out of conflict due to longer normalization periods.

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18 For detailed discussion of the major features and functions of these institutions, see Rodrik (2007: 155-161). We suggest that the identified institutions mirror the instrumental freedoms identified by Sen in his approach to development: Sen, A.K., (1999), Development as Freedom; Oxford University Press, Oxford.
1.4. Elements of the Approach:

21. The original thinking behind this document identified a number of issues that need to be broached to inform the social debate on building a consensus towards a sustainable political transformation. Background papers were prepared by experts on culture and identity, security, constitution, governance and institutions, socio-economic dimension (with specialized papers on education and health) and foreign relations.

22. The adopted methodology for preparing the expert papers included a brief description of the status quo (with detailed microeconomic information whenever available), and proposals for change (identifying agencies to undertake the initiative for change, the expected time duration, the costs involved, and the sources of funds). A summary of these papers is included in Appendix D for challenges and Appendix E for proposals. In view of the ultimate objective of this document stated in bold in paragraph 2 above and in the conceptual framework, a careful perusal of the expert papers reveals that two major strands for required reforms to be agreed upon through a deliberative process and public debate on the future of the country. One strand deals with the pillars of a modern state, presented in Section II, and discusses issues pertaining to developing a national identity, managing ethnic diversity, governance and constitutional reforms, rule of law, reform of electoral laws, and institutional reforms. The second strand, presented in Section III, deals with the structural transformation of the economy and development policies. At the operational level, the two strands are obviously closely related in view of the fact that the legitimacy of a modern developmental state depends crucially on its performance in terms of achieving prosperity for its citizens. Section IV of the document deals with modalities while Section V concludes.
II. Pillars of a Modern State:

23. The successive failure of governments in Sudan is generally agreed to be the result of a number of inter-related causes, the interaction between which prohibited effective nation and state building. These causes can be summarized in (i) the inability of political elites to develop a nationhood construct of shared values and common experience around which distinct communities in the country can coalesce; (ii) the inability to manage ethnic diversity; and (iii) the failure to pose and answer fundamental questions about the nature of the state and the system of governance. A combination of these failures resulted in weak democratic governments mired in internal politics and incapable of managing the multiple challenges facing a post-colonial multi-cultural country. The instability of all three of these governments and their swift ousting by military coups that invariably led to long periods of autocratic rule is ample evidence for the fragility of the foundational elements of a nation state that the political elite managed to forge post-independence and of the absence of majority acceptance of the political process, a necessary condition for the stability of governments.¹⁹ While the protracted civil war in South Sudan that eventually led to its secession in 2011 started on the eve of independence, numerous opportunities for the effective resolution of this and other conflicts arose in the period since and were missed because of the perpetual failure to address the above delineated issues comprehensively and in depth.

24. In the context of Sudan, the combination of a governance system characterized by a concentration of political and administrative powers in the centre and the complete absence of a citizenship construct capable of assuring different sectors of the society of their prospects in the country has led to numerous internal conflicts and is likely to continue to generate new wars unless effectively managed. A key aspect of the conceptualization of an inclusive citizenship construct in a multi-ethnic, multi-cultural country like Sudan is settling on a national identity. So far, the failure of the political elite to build political consensus over issues of identity has precluded the establishment of a state that functions as a “concentration and expression of collective power without the use of coercion.”²⁰ Unresolved identity questions undermine the social foundation essential for the legitimacy of the state²¹ and have, in the case of Sudan, divided the polity.

25. Nurturing a sense of mutual belonging anew in Sudan will also depend on the fair accommodation of the current needs and concerns of those at the periphery who bore the brunt of the current regime’s policies of promoting

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²⁰Ibid, p. 584.
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the dominant Arab/Islamist identity. Efforts to resolve the tension between the centre and regions in Sudan with distinctive cultural and linguistic features have already been attempted by different regimes, albeit reluctantly, as part of peace agreements settling armed conflicts. These include the adoption of a federal system of government designed to grant autonomy to the South in 1972 that was later applied to the rest of the country and a similar arrangement enshrined in the 2005 Interim Constitution. While the direction towards a federal system of government is consistent with the need to afford distinct communities with measures of autonomy in regulating their internal affairs, the cession of the South is clear evidence of the failure of the system to cater for unity within the federation. There are also concerns about the inefficiency of the current system.

Developing a National Identity

26. The construction of a coherent and inclusive national identity capable of providing every citizen with a sense of mutual belonging regardless of cultural, religious or ethnic background is essential to a program of nation and state building following the collapse of this regime. As stated above, nation building must be considered a cornerstone and a necessary precondition for legitimizing the state and successfully advancing robust state structures capable of supporting sustainable political transformation as noted above.

27. Resolving issues of identity is a prerequisite to determining the nature of the state and affecting sustainable constitutional reforms guided by a widely accepted concept of nationhood. It is, therefore, essential that a process of building political consensus over issues of identity is accelerated. This process must, however, be cognizant of the interdependence between national identity and constitutional reforms, in that while a sense of shared values and common goals must guide the drafting of a new constitution for the country, the constitutional text will further contribute to identity formation in the country and a consolidation of a feeling of mutual belonging to a state with certain characteristics.

28. It is evident that previous conceptualizations of Sudan as primarily Arab/Islamic were at best misguided and at worst damaging. A reverse formulation that completely denies or disregards the relevance of Islam and Arabism on Sudan and its people would, however, be equally damaging. Guarding against this risk should be straightforward provided the deliberative

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political process that eventually culminates in agreement over resolving issues of identity and providing for them in the constitution is inclusive of all sectors of the Sudanese society and subject to public scrutiny. It is also to be noted that the parameters of a national identity framework, given the multi-cultural multi-ethnic makeup of Sudan, is closely related to the extent to which local identities can be accommodated through policies aimed at the effective management of ethnic diversity, including the provision of the agreed upon decentralized system of governance capable of accommodating the aspirations of distinct communities to have their cultures recognized and respected.

29. The question of Islam and its role in a new Sudan should be addressed as part of the identity question. Given the tension generated in some regions in the periphery by adopting Islam as the reference point for the state as well as the utilization of Islamic laws for political oppression by successive regimes and the current regime in particular, it is imperative to consider the option of separating religion from the state while guaranteeing the right to freedom of conscience in the constitution. Given the sensitivity of the undertaking, it may be necessary to start by measures aimed at education in an attempt to reverse years of indoctrination pursued by the current regime. The transitional period would also benefit from building public confidence both in its competence and motivation prior to the advancement of this item for resolution.

30. Unity in diversity is the only way forward to keep Sudan together based on a commonality of a new social, political, cultural dispensation. It is not Arabism or Africanism nor Christianity or Islam that can unite the Sudan. It is Sudanism that can bring us together and take us into a bright future.

Managing Ethnic Diversity:

31. One of the most pressing challenges that policy makers in a new Sudan will have to confront is the question of managing ethnic diversity and the need to address past grievances of communities in Sudan.

32. It is conceded that the concept of identity is a multi-faceted one and that citizens can hold multiple identities depending on their role in society. While the cultural dissonance between the centre and certain parts of the country (e.g. Darfur, Blue Nile, South Kordofan, Red Sea and Kassala) is not in itself problematic, the pursuit of social-engineering policies aimed at Islamization and Arabization of populations in these parts by the Inqaz government compounded the perception of conflict between the dominant identity (Islamic and Arab) and other equally viable self-definations. Care must therefore be taken not to entrench the already existing perceptions of the incompatibility of these identities by fortifying local nationalism to the determent of developing a cohesive and inclusive national identity capable of accommodating a wide range of asymmetrical self-definations.
33. In addition to providing for enforceable constitutional safeguards guaranteeing non-discrimination, religious and cultural freedoms and rights, and recognition and respect for diversity, the burden of reconciling local identities to a mutual sense of belonging based on concepts of citizenship would largely fall on the shoulders of democratically identified political leadership. It is, therefore, incumbent on political parties, when seeking internal reforms, to bear in mind the question of managing expectations of divergent communities regarding the political process. This, however, would be greatly aided by the design of governance and political accountability systems that take into consideration the need for decentralization of government and regional autonomy. Building political consensus on all these issues through a constitutional conference must also engage the opinions of leaders of the communities in question.

34. The failure of cultural reform to address the concerns of communities in the periphery will have a negative impact on security and the unity of the country. Commitment to cultural reform policies in all sectors of government should be a priority of decision makers both in the transitional period and afterwards. There has to be put in place a system of assessing the negative impact of new legislation or executive action on the rights of distinct communities to recognition and respect of their culture or on the limits of autonomy as conferred on these communities by the constitution. It should also be noted that managing ethnic diversity has implications for education, economic, and social policy and should be one of the issues on which ministerial action is coordinated both within and after a transitional period.

**Governance and Constitutional Reforms:**

35. Because the successive failures of governments in Sudan occurred against a backdrop of changeable constitutional frameworks, the main task of a post-\textit{Inqaz} administration would be to work towards enshrining a permanent constitution for Sudan validated by wide and inclusive political participation and addressing questions of social justice, national identity, the relationship of the centre to the periphery and federalism, as well as issues concerning political accountability and respect for the rule of law including modalities for the separation of powers. Guiding principles embodying the spirit of political change should be promulgated, providing the space for further organic political and judicial evolution. However, in order to allow for such evolution, the role of the judiciary \textit{viz-a-viz} the constitution should be clearly set out, and certain fundamental individual rights must be enforceable through the courts.

36. Both the 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement and the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement sought to grant the South self-rule in an attempt to quell the civil war that raged in the country since the eve of Independence. A federal or decentralized system of governance has since been adopted to govern the
rest of the country. There is now general consensus that the federal system must be reformed to ensure cost-effectiveness and the desired benefits of power and wealth sharing. The most common view in this respect is to adopt a regional federation that can address new realities, such as war affected areas, and serve as hubs of cultural convergence between different parts of the country (see Appendix E-2). While past arrangements may be informative when considering a system of decentralized governance that takes into account the historical grievances and aspirations of regions at the periphery and aims for equitable power and wealth sharing between the different parts of the country, it is essential to evaluate these attempts to determine the extent of their successes and failures and to understand what contributed to each given the particular context.

37. The question of how to govern a multi-cultural, multi-ethnic Sudan with chronic tension between the center and the periphery is central to the future security and stability of the country and should be settled through a deliberative process involving wide-political participation and subject to public scrutiny. This consultative process should also be informed by views from the regions in question that transcend existing political structures. Engaging leaders of local communities may be a good way to gauge public sentiment in this respect. For any future system of governance to survive the current state of political disillusionment and perpetual distrust of the central government, such a system has to be seen as a mutual covenant between the people of these regions and the rest of the country that must be respected at all times by both parties.

38. The national constitution should include mechanisms for adequate representation of regional views in federal policy making and adequate checks and balances on executive action affecting regions. In general, in parliamentary systems of governance where the executive branch gets its legitimacy from controlling the legislative branch (e.g. UK system of governance), the executive and legislative competencies of federal units coincide. This requires less coordination between the regional and central governments and allows for greater decentralization. The extent of decentralization and the degree of autonomy granted to regions in terms of legislative and administrative powers should be agreed upon and protected in the national constitution to guarantee stability and development.

39. Before settling on the particular features of a viable system of federal governance, a survey of existing federations should be undertaken in order to identify a system suitable for the conditions of Sudan. The Ethiopian experience is relevant for study especially because it caters for ethnic

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24Ibid.

diversity within the country. When deciding on how to define the different regions, attention must be directed not just to the stability of the regional unit in question, but also to the prospect of sustainable unity within the federation.

40. The risk of regional disintegration in Sudan is particularly high given the experience of the secession of the South. One of the main factors contributing to the disintegration of federations is conflict between regional political visions and national political direction. To guarantee mutual trust and a willingness to cooperate, reforms of electoral laws and laws regulating political parties must be undertaken. Multi-regional (national) parties will have a positive effect on unifying the country and should be encouraged alongside regional parties. National political parties themselves have to consider the future of regional concerns within their party politics and must consider issues of party discipline and strategies to push for regional agendas. It is also essential to guarantee respect for the constitution at all times and see to it that the Constitutional Court functions to ensure the adherence to constitutional guarantees and limits of executive power with respect to regional units.

41. The organization of federal government should be cognizant of the underlying economic and efficiency cost to decentralization and should pursue reforms that are most suitable to the conditions in Sudan. While using existing federal structures may be the most efficient option, extensive reforms may be called for to avoid the experience of the secession of the South.

Rule of Law

42. A move towards sustainable political transformation along the lines identified above requires respect for the rule of law, an end to executive abuse of power, and arbitrariness of executive action. Conceptualizations of the rule of law differ, but they all aim to ensure the supremacy of law by making all private and public entities - including the state itself - accountable to laws that are clear, certain, predictable and equally enforceable before independent courts. The doctrine of separation of powers is also thought to be an essential element of an effective rule of law state where laws are made by a body representative of the polity, governments are subject to limits set priori in the constitution and the laws of the country, and the

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26Ibid.
27Watts, R. L., fn 22.
28Ibid.
judiciary is capable of holding governments to such limits through judicial review actions guaranteeing, among other things, the rights of individual citizens. The first two of these requirements have to be provided for in the constitutional review process pursued during the transitional period. Ensuring the independence of the judiciary should be treated as a stand-alone task for the transitional government and may benefit from cross-fertilization with reforms of the public service.

43. Given the post-conflict, post-autocracy context of a new Sudan, it may be essential to provide for substantive limits to the law in the constitution (e.g. guaranteeing fundamental human rights and individual autonomy) in order to ensure the development of a rule-of-law state capable of sustainable political transformation in a context of ethnic diversity and past grievances. Providing for such guarantees would alleviate fears over governmental excesses and the subordination of individual autonomy to collective rights.

44. To ensure reconciliation between different ethnic constituencies in the country, some form of relevant transitional justice mechanism is required. A credible modality addressing historical wrongs should address both conflict-related crimes and crimes committed by the government, including war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide and misappropriation of public resources. The enactment of new laws relevant to the issue of transitional justice and accountability of public bodies under the current regime may be necessary and should reflect a commitment to fundamental human rights in the new constitution as well as improving access to justice for remote affected communities. Given the requirements for legal and institutional reforms facing the administration during the first years of transition, it may be a good idea to use already existing international and regional structures to ensure accountability of the members of the current regime and its leaders for past wrongs. This will send a positive message to communities affected by conflict, enhance nation-building and may indicate the onset of a new dawn of political accountability and respect for the rule of law.

45. Certain aspects of the legal system require immediate attention: (i) Criminal law and justice; because of its effect on fundamental human rights, which would require institutional reform of its enforcement arms including the police; (ii) Commercial law; to ensure certainty and predictability and to provide for an environment conducive to economic growth; and (iii) land laws because of its importance in regulating relationships between tribal communities and its role in fueling recent conflicts in the country. It has been suggested that a Law Reform Commission established during the


31Ibid.
transitional period would contribute to efforts in this respect.\textsuperscript{32} New vetting and lustration laws should also be enacted to ascertain the suitability of individuals to hold political, civil service or judiciary positions in a new Sudan if they served under the previous regime (see institutional reform section below). Legal reforms should also include reforms of electoral laws as follows.

**Electoral Laws Reform:**

46. The working assumption in this document is that an effective transitional period is likely to organically lead to peace and democratic rule following the required institutional reforms. It would, therefore, be prudent to discuss necessary reforms of electoral laws.

47. Reforming electoral laws should take into consideration that the previous democratic governments repeatedly produced coalition governments that were not able to affect tangible reform programs. The consensus amongst commentators is that a Proportional Representation (PR) system should be adopted to ensure representation of wider segments of the society.\textsuperscript{33} While the advantages of a PR system are conceded, such a system is likely to produce coalition governments, which are known to be less stable and less effective. In some countries, the stability of governments is assured by requiring that the prime minister be directly elected. A similar system may prove more suitable for Sudan.

**Political Parties:**

48. The success of political reforms in Sudan will depend to a large extent on the ability of political parties to evolve according to the current needs of the country. The long period of autocratic rule under the current regime has further stultified their development and operation, and the effective future contribution of political parties will depend on their ability to rehabilitate themselves through training, effective reorganization, and the adoption of internal democratic practices. This work should in essence be attempted pre-transition in preparation for active involvement in the deliberative process that is expected to take place following the change of the current regime.

**Institutional Reforms:**

49. The focus in the first few months of the transitional period should be on effecting reforms of key institutions in order to reverse years of politicization pursued by the current regime. The following suggestions are not exhaustive

\footnotesize\textsuperscript{32}Oette and Babiker, fn 30.\footnotesize

\footnotesize\textsuperscript{33}Mohamed A. Z. A., fn 23.\footnotesize
of all required reforms.

50. Civil Service Reforms: A comprehensive study of the sector should be initiated first. Reforms of the civil service should aim at guaranteeing independence and should include the use of lustration and vetting laws to ensure the exclusion of current regime members from key positions and to ensure equal opportunity through affirmative action. Long-term reforms should also include re-training and education programs aimed at enlisting a sense of national commitment to change and the rule of law. The pervading culture of corruption and nepotism in the civil service will also have to be combated through the enactment of relevant laws and the restructuring of existing units.

51. The Judiciary: An overhaul of the judiciary is necessary to ensure its independence and effectiveness both in terms of vetting those holding office in its ranks and in terms of providing for the effective separation of powers between the judiciary and the executive branches of government in a new constitution. Such independence of the judiciary should be understood to apply to individual judges in performing their functions. An independent judiciary is essential both for the unbiased resolution of conflicts and for keeping the power of the Executive in check.

52. During the transitional period, the priority should be to compose a new constitutional court capable of supervising the actions of the transitional government by reference to agreed principles of good governance.

53. A program for the institutional reform of the judiciary should take into consideration the fact that transitional justice requirements in a post-conflict, post-autocracy country would place a considerable burden on the system initially. Measures for addressing this front-loading aspect of the transition should be in place to avoid delaying necessary reforms. The establishment of a separate hybrid tribunal to address the previous regime’s crimes and abuse of power may be more viable. As mentioned above, use of existing international structures is also recommended.

54. Legal education and training should be reformed with the objective of Manning the judiciary and equipping the legal profession with the necessary knowledge and skills to facilitate access to justice especially post-transition. The legal profession would also be key in building an effective rule of law and a culture of constitutionalism based on confidence in the legal system. A complete reform of the requirements of the law degree may therefore be necessary and should be carried out in coordination with the judiciary, the Bar Association, and the relevant Higher Education ministry.

55. The Security Sector (Military, Security and Police): Security arrangements under the current regime are characterized by a persistent conflation of law enforcement, intelligence, and military objectives. In general, the police,
secret service and the military are all being used by the current regime to entrench its power and would require a substantial overhaul and reorganization in order to ensure a shift in understanding their respective roles within a legitimate state structure. Reform and restructuring will lead to a professional, unified and national security sector that reflects the diversity of the Sudanese society. This should be treated as an urgent priority because of the civil conflict risk inherent in mismanaging this sector.

56. One of the main concerns with respect to the military is the concurrent existence of multiple militias aligned with the government, the disarmament, demobilization or re-integration of which into the restructured regular national forces is likely to pose its own challenges because of the asymmetrical employment benefits between the Special Forces and the regular army.

57. It is also essential to develop a plan for disarmament and demobilization of armed groups currently in opposition to the central government, taking into account various regional and international experiences.

58. It is to be noted that the availability of alternative economic opportunities will be a determining factor in the effective disarmament and demobilization of the various forces involved in armed conflict at the moment.
III. Structural Transformation and Economic Management:

The Record of the Recent Past

59. Prior to June 1999, the structure of the Sudan economy was similar to that of most developing countries, especially Sub-Saharan ones, where agriculture dominated production, employment and exports; industry (inclusive of mining) was rudimentary with manufacturing very marginal, and services fairly large. Such a structure is a distorted one with a major feature of low productivity. The developmental challenges facing such economies is seen to be structural transformation where resources are shifted from low productivity sectors to relatively high productivity ones. In the early stages of development, effecting a structural transformation in a country required deliberate action by governments to manage the economies concerned. Such was the conventional wisdom of development thinking up to the 1980s before the advent of the so called “Structural Adjustment Programs” (SAPs) technically developed by an IMF-World Bank coalition and imposed on developing countries by the donor community. SAPs imposed a neoliberal economic ideology on developing countries. The central core of such an ideology is to "get the prices right, unleash the markets and rein in the state”.

60. It is now well known that since June 1989, the Sudan economy (unified and subsequently split) was managed by a political regime that fully subscribed to the neoliberal economic ideology. The central core of the ideology is marketed to the population as being consistent with Islamic values and dictates. Since 1997, however, the unified Sudan was implementing economic policies under successive IMF Staff Monitored Programs (SMP). Such policies continued to be used even after the country became an oil exporter in September 1999 and after the secession of the South, which meant the loss of an estimated 75% of oil production. These programs, according to the IMF “provided the authorities with comprehensive frameworks to design and implement policies and reforms to address their economic challenges. They helped the authorities to stabilize the economy through tight monetary and fiscal policies and supported the modernization of tools to manage the economy, including through reforms in monetary operations, tax policy, and public financial management.”

61. As is well known, a major promise of such programs is that they help countries ignite growth. A huge literature exists that attempts to test this claim, using sophisticated quantitative methodologies. In the case of Sudan under the current ruling regime, a simple before-and-after test is recently reported. Average real per capita GDP growth is compared across four

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periods: 1985-1989 representing a period before Ingaz (with an average growth rate of 2.2 percent average real per capita GDP); 1990-1997 a before oil production period (with a growth rate of 2.3 percent average real per capita GDP); 1998-2010 a before secession period (with a growth rate of 4.1 percent average real per capita GDP); and 2011-2015 the current Sudan (with a negative growth rate of 1.4 percent average real per capita GDP).

62. A major feature of the growth process that happened in the country was that it did not have a human face, ala UNICEF; and it was a jobless growth process, ala the International Labor Organization (ILO). The human facelessness of the oil driven growth process is shown to exhibit itself in the none-inclusive nature of the growth as reflected in the increase in the spread and depth of poverty. The joblessness nature of registered growth is evidenced by the fact that the unemployment rate remained high for the three respective Ingaz sub-periods at 15%, 14.8% and 14.7%. This is perhaps not surprising in view of the fact that it was oil driven, and oil production is a capital intensive economic activity. Moreover, and as noted above, the policies adopted over the period 1990-2016 did not have a social content to speak of.

63. Moreover, it can easily be shown that almost all of the economic policies and programs implemented since 1990 did not have any social protection policies to speak of, except perhaps for a bloated and highly distortive Zakat arrangement.36 Despite this, a spate of recent papers attempted the evaluation of social safety nets and social protection programs in country. The general conclusion reached by these papers is that the country’s existing programs are complicated in institutional structure, limited in coverage, lack coordination, and lack monitoring and evaluation.37

Future Development Reorientation

64. Appreciating the low level of development from which the country will be starting, the multiple challenges noted above would require the pursuit of enlightened and relevant development policies. To explore such relevant policies, it is imperative to recall, albeit briefly, the type of development policies pursued by developing countries prior to the 1980. The story, briefly told, is that in the 1960’s, most of the newly independent developing countries, diverse as they were, adopted a planning approach to effect deep-seated changes in their economies and societies. Such an approach was widely supported by the major theoretical and policy propositions of the

36 Zakat is an Islamic levy, the resources of which are supposed to cater for needy individuals and households. Under the current regime, the organizational structure for Zakat became akin to a state within a state.

37 For a review of these papers see Ali (2017; mentioned in footnote 35).
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pioneers of development economics. These propositions, we hasten to note, were fully adopted by the United Nations which eventually formulated them in detailed policy and planning manuals for the benefit of policy makers in developing countries. Even the World Bank contributed to the art of designing national development plans at the time.

65. The pioneers of development thinking formulated grand and visionary models of development strategy that aimed at effecting a structural transformation with a central role assigned to the government in planning and programming development. The policy content of these models was informed by the observation that the developing economies were characterized by pervasive market failures, and that to correct or avoid market failure, central coordination and allocation of resources are required. Moreover, government action to correct market failure found considerable theoretical support in welfare economics. In addition to pervasive market failures, the role of the government was justified on the belief that the supply of entrepreneurs was limited in these countries, and that major structural changes, rather than marginal adjustments, were needed to effect development. Thus, the “government of a developmental state was to promote capital accumulation, utilize reserves of surplus labor, undertake policies of deliberate industrialization and economic diversification, relax the foreign exchange constraint through import substitution, and coordinate the allocation of resources through programming and planning.”

66. Programming and planning to develop, to coordinate the allocation of resources by the government, is understood at the time as an alternative way for rational, consistent and coordinated economic and social policies. An obvious reason for why developing countries need to plan their development is the recognition that, under the then existing historical conditions, development would not take place automatically. Under such understanding, the essential role of planning economic development is in assuring the required productive investment for growth and development.

67. A major controversy that surrounded the experience of planning in developing countries, including African ones, had to do with the policy content of the planning approach to development, especially the methods recommended for the mobilization of resources for productive investment. As it happened, the methods recommended for use in various proportions, depending on the development stage of the country, included the nationalization of industries, finance, trade, and foreign owned natural resources; the contribution to state finance from agrarian reform; in addition to general taxation, public loans and deficit financing. In this respect, it is significant to note that a method of inducing private savers to undertake productive investment was also recommended. It is noted that such inducement of private savers can be achieved by, among other measures, the taxation of unproductive use of wealth, compulsory saving, appropriate restrictions on the distribution of profits and compulsory loans. Thus, for
those infatuated with the role of the private sector in the development process, there is no ground for equating the practice of comprehensive planning with an antagonistic dispensation towards the private sector, however embryonic such a sector may be.

68. The demise of the planning approach to the development of poor countries started with the resurgence of the liberal ideology in economic thinking and the dominance of neoclassical economic theory. As a result neoclassical economic theory started to be globally marketed by the IMF-World Bank coalition as being good for the governments of the developing countries. “Governments were admonished not only to remove price distortions but also to ‘get all policies right’. Not differences in initial conditions but differences in policies were now thought to explain the disparate performances of developing countries. A country was not poor because of the vicious cycle of poverty but because of poor policies. Markets, prices and incentives should be of central concern in policy making.”

69. The new development wisdom was embodied in the Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) of the World Bank and the IMF which were imposed on developing countries, especially African countries since the early 1980s and up to the end of the 1990s. In this context, it is now firmly established in the specialized literature that the World Bank’s commissioned Berg Report provided the theoretical justification for SAPs. The advent of SAPs, with the accompanied array of conditions, marked the end of post-independence attempts at development planning in developing countries, especially import-substitutions.

70. From the above rather brief outline, it should be clear that the planning approach to development and SAPs approach to the management of the macroeconomics of a developing country share two basic, but differentiated, features: (a) a focus on economic growth, with the planning approach aiming at achieving economic growth over a relatively long period under successive 5 year plans, while SAPs promising the achievement of economic growth in shorter periods of time; and (b) a concern with policies, with the planning approach seeking to identify relevant development policies for the mobilization of required investment resources to achieve the planned rate of growth, while SAPs imposing macroeconomic policies believed to be effective in achieving higher rates of growth as conditions for a country receiving aid resources from donors. The medium to long term perspective of planning is now somewhat reserved for poverty reduction strategy papers.

71. As is well known in the early years of the development experience of developing countries over the period since 1960 and up to the middle of the
1970s, development policy revolved around social equity mechanisms including public expenditure on health and education, food price subsidies, agricultural input price subsidies, other social transfers and public employment. From the middle of the 1970s up to the end of 1990s, under SAPs, such policies came to be labelled as “poor economic policies.”

72. After wasting two decades on experimentation with SAP policies and certain sectoral policies, the donor community is rediscovering that what they dubbed as "bad economic policies" do, after all, constitute relevant development policies in the context of poor countries, especially those in Sub-Saharan Africa. 39

73. Be the above as it may, and in recognition of the urgent need to formulate “relevant development policies,” the United Nations Department for Economic and Social Affairs (UN DESA) commissioned a number of policy notes to help developing countries in preparing “national development strategies” as per the recommendation of the UN Social Summit of 2005. 40 According to the preface of the volume collecting these notes, the objective of preparing them is to “provide those at the country level who shape and set policies, with a range of policy alternatives to the standard policy solutions that have prevailed over the past two decades... and to help countries take advantage of and expand their policy space.”

74. The policies relevant to the formulation of national development strategies discussed in the notes included macroeconomic and growth policies, trade policy, investment and technology policies, financial policies, social policy, and state-owned enterprise reform. As a reflection on the experience of developing countries with neoliberal policies, it is noted that while macroeconomic stability is a necessary condition for development and growth, the record of the past two decades shows that recently fashionable ideas, and policy recommendations, of what makes for good macroeconomic management and for such stability have been overly narrow. Indeed, in many countries they have wrought the opposite of what was intended.

75. The experience of the past two decades, it is suggested, gave rise to a broad “understanding that macroeconomic management in open developing economies should be guided by the following considerations”:

(i) A planning approach: In the context of a planning approach to the management of an open developing country, “macroeconomic policy


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needs to be developed within a coordinated framework, so that fiscal, monetary, exchange rate and capital management are consistent.” The consistency of the macroeconomic policies needs to be ascertained for the medium term to provide the “contours within which macroeconomic and public expenditure strategies are organized.”

(ii) The design of macroeconomic policy: In a planning approach macroeconomic economic policy is expected to be based on the overall objectives of the plan. Economic growth, livelihood stability, and employment generation must be given significance and should not be crowded out by an overly narrow focus on macroeconomic stability and inflation control.

(iii) Objective of Policy: It is not just the aggregate rate of economic growth, but also the pattern of that growth, which is crucial. For most countries, the primary goal should be productive employment generation providing decent work. This requires more than macroeconomic policy alone; in particular, industrial policies providing carefully considered incentives to promote desired investment and financial policies, including directed credits, will play a role.

(iv) Public Expenditure: The significance of public expenditure in sustaining and expanding the productive human resource base of the country through social spending must be recognized. Macroeconomic policies must ensure that public expenditure in the social sectors is maintained at adequate levels. Developing country governments need to be more confident of the positive effects of appropriate expansionary fiscal policy, and in particular, of the critical role of public investment.

(v) Revenue Mobilization: there needs to be more emphasis on raising public resources in ways that do not adversely affect the poor through effective implementation of progressive direct taxation, flexible trade taxes, and taxes on capital movements.

(vi) Monetary and Exchange Rate Policy: monetary policy should accommodate fiscal policy, not the other way around, and both should be targeted to real economic goals such as employment generation, livelihood protection and expansion and poverty reduction. Exchange rates should be flexibly managed even to the point of creating a band within which market forces are allowed to work. This requires some control over capital account movements, preferably through a range of flexible instruments.
76. In a similar vein, the UN Economic Commission for Africa, in a series of its flagship publication, the Economic Report on Africa, explored the range of development policies suitable for African countries to structurally transform their economies. For the years 2015 and 2013, the reports called on African countries to formulate and implement country specific industrial policies. In this respect, a relevant sectoral policy that needs to be formulated is one dealing with reversing the negative impact of the land grab phenomena on dispossessed local communities.

77. We hasten to note that the above guidelines imply, for all intents and purposes, the reinstatement of the crux of the development policies of the 1940s and 1950s. However, such reinstatement would require taking note of the economic and political changes that took place in the world over the past sixty years or so, including those brought about by the third wave of globalization and the pressures of the global financial crisis.

IV. Modalities:

78. Over the past two and a half decades, Sudanese people from all walks of life, except perhaps those politically committed to the ideology of political Islam, have been pondering the calamities that befell their country. These Sudanese expressed their views on the issues discussed in this document by various means including books, academic articles, policy papers, and newspaper and social media items. This is a wealth of information that could be mobilized to inform the preparations for specialized conferences on the issues discussed in this document. As such, this is but one contribution in the endeavor towards creating a viable modern state in the Sudan and should serve to facilitate reaching consensus on the various issues mentioned.

79. This document has so far dealt with the substantive issues that require attention during a transitional period and expounded theories of necessary reforms to guarantee a successful political transition in the country post-Inqaz. However, and because of the need to commit from the outset to values of representative government and the rule of law, both the form and procedure adopted to affect the necessary constitutional, legal and policy reforms will impact the trajectory of the country post-transition. If a successful political transition is to materialize, it is essential to secure and ensure an effective broad-based political engagement of the various opposition forces within the country. The convergence of these forces on the need to end conflict, establish a rule-of-law state, and work towards good governance allows for constructive dialogue of the issues highlighted above.

80. The incoming regime should feel confident to hold specialized conferences on any of the issues dealt with in this document, not only to garner broad political support, but also as a step towards solidifying the process of building a national identity. As usual, in preparation of these conferences, a wide-ranging effort should be exerted to review the Sudanese literature which accumulated over time dealing with the substantive aspects alluded to in this document. This will obviously require sufficient funding from local sources as well as mobilization from donors sympathetic to the objectives stated above.

81. Needless to note, the above efforts will require sufficient time to develop, organize and implement. Such time duration is expected to be commensurate with the damage caused to Sudanese society over the past period. This implies agreement on a suitable transitional period, bearing in mind the legitimacy cost to having an excessively long transition. Past experience indicates that a too-short transitional period invites destabilization of democratic processes and does not allow for laying the foundation for a sustainable modern state. Reflecting some of the proposals in the background papers, a minimum transitional period of 4 years seems sufficient to undertake some of the major interventions required.
82. Appendix C includes suggestions of the action plans discussed above. These actions are drawn with a timeline, the acting entities involved, and the sources of funding. The first table includes the essential steps for identity reconstruction action, rule of law and institution building. The second table is oriented towards developmental issues such as security, health and foreign relations. Actions should be started in parallel and the time frame suggested indicates the span of time each action should take.
V. Concluding Remark:

83. Irrespective of the institutional reforms envisaged in this document, inclusive of government reforms, the forces in charge of effecting the hoped for sustainable political transformation in the country need to be cognizant of the fact that the international community is no longer sympathetic to the discourse on and actions towards “regime change.”
APPENDIX A: Sudan - Fragile States Index 2012-2017

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Source: [www.fundforpeace.org](http://www.fundforpeace.org)
APPENDIX B: Development Indicators for Sudan

Sudan’s Sectoral decomposition of value added as % of GDP, 1980-2013

Inflation consumer prices (annual %)

[Graph showing sectoral decomposition and inflation consumer prices]
Unemployment rate in relation to GDP growth

Source: World Bank, World Development Indicator
## APPENDIX C: Recommended Action Plans

### Identity Reconstruction, Rule of Law and Institution Building

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actions</th>
<th>Acting Entities</th>
<th>Funding Source</th>
<th>Time Period</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Form a transitional government (TGoS)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Declare an immediate and monitored ceasefire:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ SAF and the forces of the armed struggle remain in their respective places.</td>
<td>Sudan Armed Forces (SAF)</td>
<td>TGoS</td>
<td>2 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Militias disbanded.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Police restructured to maintain civic nature.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Compose a constitutional court capable of supervising the actions of the transitional government.</strong></td>
<td>Ministry of Justice, Bar Association, Civil society</td>
<td>UN-related agencies</td>
<td>4 month</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Reform civil service and other important entities in the country (e.g. mass media) to eliminate traces of the old regime.</strong></td>
<td>All ministries</td>
<td>TGoS</td>
<td>6 month</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Identify civil society representatives and other figureheads, who are trusted by the public, to spread the ideas of a national identity capable of accommodating a wide range of asymmetrical self-definition.</strong></td>
<td>TGoS</td>
<td>TGoS</td>
<td>2 month</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Generate discussions and design a framework for a more tolerant, socially representative constitution incorporating recommendations from this (the roadmap) document.</strong></td>
<td>TGoS with political parties and civil society representation</td>
<td>TGoS, Donors</td>
<td>4 month</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Employ the media and international relations to ensure accountability of the current regime and its leader for past wrongs</strong></td>
<td>All ministries</td>
<td>TGoS</td>
<td>2 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Draft a new constitution, taking into account regional, gender and ethnic differences.</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>8 month</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actions</td>
<td>Acting Entities</td>
<td>Funding Source</td>
<td>Time Period</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restructure an independent judicial system that undertakes the principles of the rule of law and separation of powers.</td>
<td>UN, Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs, Ministry of the Interior</td>
<td>UN grants, Donors, TGoS</td>
<td>1 year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Initiate programs for national reconciliation and use intensive media programs, targeting the identity restructuring problems and discussing national unity.</td>
<td>Ministries Political parties, Civil society, UN</td>
<td>TGoS, Donors</td>
<td>4 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raise awareness of the problem of education using mass media in such a way that public resources are mobilized and individuals start to respond to education as a national target.</td>
<td>Ministry of Education, Civil society</td>
<td>TGoS, UNESCO, Donors</td>
<td>4 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restructure the education system, taking into consideration the requirements of identity restructuring (i.e civic education), and respecting the different needs of the society (e.g. nomadic schools).</td>
<td>Ministry of Education</td>
<td>Donors, UNESCO</td>
<td>2 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Initiate programs to support the internal reform of political parties.</td>
<td>Political parties, Civil society</td>
<td>TGoS, Donors - EU</td>
<td>2 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support cultural bands and theaters, establishing public libraries and art galleries and renovate historical sites.</td>
<td>Ministry of Culture and Information</td>
<td>Ministry of Culture and Information UNESCO</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employ economic stabilization to address inflation and exchange rate problems.</td>
<td>MoFNE</td>
<td>TGoS</td>
<td>2 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institute ideological change of the economic system and economic reform in accordance with the roadmap.</td>
<td>All ministries</td>
<td>Donors</td>
<td>4 years</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Security, Health and Foreign Relations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actions</th>
<th>Acting Entities</th>
<th>Funding Source</th>
<th>Time Period</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Develop a comprehensive national health policy in which the rural health policy is restored and resources are redistributed according to the country's health needs</td>
<td>TGoS, MOH, MOE, Private sector, Public and private insurance, NGOs</td>
<td>TGoS, Donors, UN</td>
<td>4 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implement a basic health service package and an employee-health care system.</td>
<td>TGoS, MOH, MOE, Private sector, Public and private insurance, NGO</td>
<td>TGoS, UNESCO, Donors</td>
<td>4 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Develop a partnership between the government and the private sector in the health and education sectors for more resource mobilization.</td>
<td>TGoS, Private sector</td>
<td>TGoS</td>
<td>2 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restructure foreign policy to intelligently serve the purpose of the country's new ideology and reforms.</td>
<td>TGoS, MFA, Consultants</td>
<td>MFR</td>
<td>2 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implement reforms of the Foreign Affairs Ministry and provide personnel training.</td>
<td>TGoS, MFA, International, regional and local diplomacy institutes</td>
<td>TGoS, Donors</td>
<td>3 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Create a permanent security arrangement to be established to protect the nation and the new constitution.</td>
<td>SAF</td>
<td>TGoS</td>
<td>3 years</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX D: Major Challenges

In this appendix, a summary of the challenges confronting the process of a sustainable political transformation is presented. The text of the appendix is almost a verbatim summary of the ideas offered by the experts.

D.1. Culture and Identity:

- **The Arabisation and Islamisation identity enforcement since the establishment of modern Sudan has been accelerated by the majority of state bureaucrats and educated elite.** Sudanese who do not subscribe to this framework feel that the survival of their culture is endangered. Consequently, the stronger the concentration of power at the center, the more vulnerable the periphery becomes.

- **The denial of language diversity is among the most important sources of conflict in modern politics.** Despite that Sudan is a multi-cultural linguistic country, there is a systematic policy to undermine the language diversity and to force one official language without recognizing the rest, and that remains a challenge for nation-building. Forcing people to speak Arabic is not only practically difficult, but it is also a violently charged symbol of un-freedom.

D.2. Constitution and Governance:

- **Sudan suffers from the lack of a political order that puts in action the different institutions of the society.** The choice between the parliamentary and presidential system of the government, or the combination of both, is one of the most important constitutional debates that should be generated. Whether a unicameral or a bi-cameral legislative system should be put in place is another important issue that should be addressed.

- **The apparent inequality between the center and the periphery requires defined headlines in the constitution.** The sub-national government and the center do not share power, and lacking is adequate allocation of competence, land ownership and wealth-sharing, in particular water resources, oil and gas.

- **Historical transitional plans indicate that the piece-meal approach causes further deepened conflicts** and fragmented body politics that has led to more cleavage and made it more difficult to come closer to a national shared vision to deal with the country’s multiple crises.

- **Sudan is considered one of the most diverse countries in terms of ethnicities and cultures.** Diversity in itself is not a problem. **The root causes of the crisis of governance in Sudan lie at the bottom of its failure to manage such diversity.** The current constitution does not give the proper respect for the numerous identities existing in Sudan. Indeed, the governance system in Sudan has always suffered from the patrimonial state problem, where the sole respected identity is
Towards a Sustainable Political Transformation in Sudan: Elements of a Roadmap

the one retrieved from the ruler. Since 1989, the agencies of the state and the administration process were driven by Inquaz autocracy under the tamkeen strategy for the benefit of Islamist elites. Successive constitutions and governments in Sudan lacked vision to engineer policies that could balance peaceful co-existence and have tried to enforce a Sudanese identity that does not grasp the multicultural and multi-ethnic nature of the Sudanese society.

D.3. Socio-Economic:

- **On the side of the development indicators, Sudan has high and rising poverty and inequality rates.** The last estimations conducted on poverty in Sudan in 2009 indicated that the poverty rate stands at 46.5%. Regional inequality is sometimes higher; in Darfur it stands at 69%. The reported Gini coefficient of 35.3 for 2013 is probably an understatement, but worse than that for neighboring countries like Ethiopia. There is low per capita GDP growth, especially noting the impressive cumulative growth of 46% for the sixties and the peak 170% for the decade of the seventies. GDP per capita was roughly $1500 in 2013 at current prices.

- **On the internal fiscal and monetary aspect, there is a juxtaposition of a low revenue base and high recurrent expenditure.** Government spending is rising at an unsustainable rate due to significant government spending on defense, security and police, while a miniscule and declining budget is going to development. Subsidies rein a significant part of the government’s budget, yet the targeting of the needy and disadvantage is inadequate as 46% to 48% of the subsidy budget goes to 20% of the top income, while only 7% goes to the 20% low income population.

- **The federal fiscal system is weak and transfers from the central government to states are done in an ad hoc and unaccountable manner,** especially after dissolving the Fiscal Financial Monitoring and Allocation Commission in 2007. Moreover, the state administrative apparatus suffers from systemic low capacity.

- **The real challenge is not only the size of the deficit per se but the manner in which it is financed.** With internal borrowing severely curtailed after the secession of South Sudan and the loss of 75% of oil revenue, the limited availability of concessional and commercial loans due to the arrears situation and poor relations with most bilateral and multilateral donors, especially IFIs as mentioned earlier, the government opted to internal borrowing from the central bank and from the public through the issuance of Shahama bonds. Internal financing reached 99.4% and then dropped to 74% in 2012 and 83% in 2013. Moreover, the external sector is plagued with a continuing increase in the current account deficit, low official reserves, capital flight, and reduced FDIs and remittances through official channels.
• The productive sectors especially agriculture and manufacturing have suffered neglect since, or even before, the oil era (Dutch Disease). There are structural bottlenecks facing those sectors. For agriculture, which accounts for 45% of GDP and employs over 70% of the labor force, there has been neglect and mismanagement by the government of the major irrigated agricultural schemes such as Gezira and Rahad schemes. Al-nafra and An-nahda are gross examples of mismanagement of resources allocated for the rehabilitation of agricultural schemes. Attempts to privatize the Gezira scheme were ill advised. Privatization endeavors in general were a far cry from best practice and were generally intended to enrich and empower the ruling party’s elite and allies; where public assets were sold at prices substantially below market levels. Corruption is rampant and civil service is in need of a comprehensive reform to correct for the butchering performed by this regime on civil service.

• Another troubling feature in the real sector and the economy at large is the dominance of the grey or shadow economy run by security and the armed forces. This includes factories, farms, corporations, service outfits and several other activities that cut across the entire economy. Some estimates of the size of this economy are as high as $65 billion, exceeding half the estimated GDP of $94 billion (in PPP) for 2014. It is our contention here that this shadow economy has been instrumental in empowering the ruling party and prolonging its life and hence the suffering of the majority of Sudan’s population.

D.4. Education:

• Since independence, education in Sudan has been used as a tool to serve the ideological agenda of the northern political elites. The Ingaz Islamist policies in this regard were only a culmination of policies of Arabization and Islamization of education implemented since independence. President Bashir announced in 1990 that the national education system at all levels should be based on Islamist values; therefore, new curricula and textbooks were developed. Also, a compulsory course based on the Qu’ran and the Hadiths was imposed on university students. Educational planning is centralized, becoming the exclusive domain of the Federal Ministry of Education. Religion and religiosity is consolidated through the educational system. The ruling regime of the Islamite in Sudan has boldly asserted its interpretation of Islam as the only righteous interpretation. The values of intolerance and religious bigotry embraced by the Muslim Brothers of Sudan have been settled to turn education into a tool for the sole purpose of sustaining power. There was clear aim to inculcate the Islamist ideology to the students and to make them congruent with the model of a submissive public that lacks the ability to think critically about governance or to challenge what the authorities are doing. Another phase of monopoly over education was getting rid of the qualified administrators and faculty members who are anti-Islamists. Education in Sudan has never had a national

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42 We may wish to note that 60% of the population are engaged in the informal sector.
objective detached from the ruling party. It has been a means for serving those in power, rather than a means for serving the public good.

- **Universities, such as Omdurman Islamic University and Africa International University, are part of the Islamists of Sudan’s plan to put the entire country under their Muslim Brothers’ ideology.** Africa International University, which is a pure Muslim Brothers’ enterprise, hosts thousands of students from various African countries. The core role of this university is to radicalize African youth within a strategy of accomplishing a transnational Islamist project. Most of the leaders and a considerable portion of the Shabab troops in Somalia are graduates of this university. One of the most important steps to be taken for a new Sudan education is restructuring of these two universities that foster radicalism inside the country and throughout the region as well.

- **The government failed to develop adequate educational policies.** The only government that tried to develop the country’s education system was Numeiri’s. However, due to inappropriate, expensive, and ambitious economic plans, the country started to enter the vicious cycle of chronic debt. The country failed in meeting the challenge of educating its growing population and keeping the quality of education intact.

- **Technical education in Sudan has been undermined since the colonial rule.** One of the problems surrounding the selection of students to enroll in technical education was that the competent students were chosen for education, while those who are wrongly deemed less-intelligent were sent to technical schools. The majority of the student population is herded into a massive channel of mind education where little or no technical skills are fostered.

- **The education system and the economic conditions did not allow for systematic retention of qualified staff and resulted in brain drain.**

- **The drop-out rates in the basic and secondary levels have been quite staggering.** Inadequacies in the education system in Sudan have resulted in the inability to retain students who are already enrolled, because of families’ economic hardships that push children to drop out to help their families.

- **The government purposely neglects public education.** The Sudanese government deliberately aimed to weaken the public sector and to finally abolish it all together. The public education system started to deteriorate due to the lack of adequate funding, while numerous private schools and universities started to emerge. The Islamist control of education yielded a two-fold future educational strategy: private education for the country’s Islamist elite and the wealthy affiliated with them, and a public education for the rest of the general public in which education has turned into mere baby-sitting. When the human’s basic right is concomitant to their level of income, inequality occurs.
• Sudan’s education system is a self-serving tool of the government. It is probably quite appropriate to say that education in Sudan has never been a mind liberating enterprise, or an enterprise that fosters modern values that support national unity, nation-building, understanding, diversity, equity and how to sustain a truly functioning democratic ruling system. It is rather a tool for creating an obedient and conforming class of elites who can probably be described as predominantly self-serving.

D.5. Health:

• The health system in Sudan suffers from health governance and stewardship problems. There is a constitutional and fiduciary requirement to uphold the right to health. Similarly to the other domains, accountability measures for monitoring, guidance and resource allocation are lacking. There is an exclusion of decision making and a narrow range of sectorial representation in platforms deciding on health matters. This causes rampant corruption and mismanagement in the health sector and health facility practices.

• The government failed to implement the existing health policies and strategies particularly by regressing from Alma Ata Declaration principles by focusing less on primary health care (PHC) and more on secondary and tertiary.

• The human resource management system in the health care sector is inadequate. The health work force density is inequitably distributed between urban and rural areas (below the WHO minimum of 2.5 health workers per 1000 people). Furthermore, the lack of an HRH management policy framework results in an uncontrolled production of weakly-trained personnel.

• The health information system is sometimes manipulated to serve political needs, and inadequate reporting creates a poor system for turning health data into usable information for decision making. This results in a weak performance of the national and disease-specific heath surveillance system as well as irrational decision-making and a poor basis for accountability at national, local and facility levels in the sector.

• The health sector has inadequate funding sources and policies. The underfunding causes inadequate coverage of the insurance scheme in such a manner that the out-of-pocket expenditure portion becomes more than 75% of total expenditure on health. Furthermore, there is an insufficient harmonization and alignment of external ODA investments in health with governmental support to the health sector, whereby most UN and donor program investments are not reflected in the national health accounts; preventing both realistic/holistic budgeting as well as proper accountability for HCF.

• There is an inappropriate prioritization in developing new infrastructure, including misguided focus on developing politically-motivated new tertiary health care institutions, while neglecting and actively dismantling existing ones.

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as well as leaving wide gaps in creation or renovation of existing primary health care infrastructure.

- **There is a neglect of previous investments and policies which helped create Sudan’s previous small but robust local manufacturing capacity for key drugs and medical supplies**, with resultant reliance on importation at high cost to the government and/or the patient. There is failure to take advantage of or to pursue actively enough international trade arrangements with key supplying countries/manufacturers as well as African and other neighbours to achieve volume discounts, to prioritize importation of generics instead of commercial brand name medicines, to join voluntary pooled procurement arrangements for childhood vaccines, HIV ARVs, maternal health commodities, and other missed opportunities.

- **The health commodity procurement standards for the public sector are deficient.** Likewise, the budgeting for public sector procurement requirements for medicines, medical supplies, health technologies, laboratory, radiology and other HTP are underprovided.

- **Reducing a basic human right like access to health service into a sheer commodity has been wickedly sought by Inga policymakers since its early days.** The adopted extreme measures in privatizing a once reverberant health system may have claimed as many victims as the raging wars in Sudan.

### D.6. Foreign Relations:

- **The recruitment policy followed by the Islamic regime led to a massive displacement of personnel.** Many diplomats and general service staff were sent to early retirement for political reasons and some were even victims of personal vendetta. The infused cadre, recruited on a partisan basis, was professionally weak and they, in turn, weakened the service and rendered it irrelevant. Personnel are recruited from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) based on loyalty rather than competency and very few became accomplished diplomats in their own right.

- **The Islamic military regime started by waging a war against some ethnic and gender groups.** 80% of women diplomats were unlawfully dismissed and their replacements were not adequately gender-friendly. Most of the present staff are ideologically aligned with the regime, without consideration for their qualifications and diversity. There is a lack of transparency in the budget allocation. The foreign ministry is not open to periodic audit. Employment, payment and mission assignments do not reflect regional representation, gender sensitivity and are not goal oriented.

- **The present regime is characterized by a very heavy secretive way of discussing issues and decision-making.** The policies they follow are formulated within a close circle of leaders, and the decisions they reach are sent down to the
implementing bodies. In the case of the MFA, neither the broad lines are charted nor implemented.

- **Sudan has many partnerships that contradict its national interests.** The nature of Sudan’s relationships with its neighboring countries and the region is turbulent in its best form. At certain stages, Sudan was at loggerheads with most of the countries it borders.

- **In the international arena, Sudan is considered by many members in the United Nations as a rouge state.** The Sudanese head of state is under investigation by the International Criminal Court (ICC) for atrocities committed in Darfur. The economic boycott is affecting its development; and the UN Human Rights Commission has put Sudan under surveillance for human rights violations. Sudan failed to join the World Trade Organization (WTO) because it does not fulfill its criteria, especially, for good governance and adherence to human rights. The country is experiencing strained relations with most multi-lateral organizations. Sudan is on the list of states sponsoring terrorism and the EU has reservations on some of the policies the Sudanese government follows internally.

- **Sudan also lacks the respect of humanitarian measures which tarnishes its image in the international arena.** Sudan is becoming a lucrative staging post for human trafficking. Human traffickers exploit those who seek refuge and subject them to all sorts of humiliation and torture that can reach physical elimination. Human trafficking in Sudan is also related to money laundering and drugs.

**D.7. Security:**

- **Government forces and militias are many.** They include: Sudan Armed Forces (SAF), previously the national army; Popular Defense Force (PDF), a government militia based on compulsory conscription; Rapid Support Forces (RSF), a standing government militia accountable to the head of state; National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS), an official organ of the state with fighting capabilities; police, an official organ of the state; Popular Security Force (PSF), a government militia; tribal militias; and, other government affiliated armed groups. The armed struggle forces are rebel organized armies involved in active combat. These include: Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF) forces, and Sudan People’s Liberation Army-North (SPLA-N).

- **The present security organs are highly partisan and ideologically aligned to the regime of the National Congress Party (NCP),** which has never provided peace and security to the Sudanese population; on the contrary, the population of Sudan has been continuously subjected to all forms of violence, including war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide. Characteristics include:
  - Promoting, nurturing and resourcing homegrown radical Islam as part of the international terrorist networks;
o Involvement of the Sudanese security organs in radical Islam terrorism in the neighboring countries and worldwide and providing refuge for radical terrorist organizations;

o Presence of armed militia and the proliferation of arms at the expense of the regular forces;

o Inter-fractional armed conflict and or ceasefire-related violations;

o Government orchestrated inter-tribal territorial fighting;

o Clandestine NCP state-sponsored armed networks;

o Politically motivated retribution and assassinations;

o Lawlessness and organized criminality (i.e. human and drug trafficking);

and

o Violent response of the government to civil resistance.
APPENDIX E: Proposed Interventions

In this appendix a summary of the proposed interventions and policies to tackle the challenges summarized in Appendix D above is presented. As per Appendix D, this is almost a verbatim summary of the ideas offered by the experts. In some areas, as education and culture, the focus is completely directed toward the long-term objectives, where the fruits of interventions in these areas are only fruitful in the long-term prospects. In the other clusters, the long-term and short-term solutions are separated.

E.1. Culture:

- **Establish a cultural commission.** Since constitutional arrangements may not be sufficient enough to guarantee cultural rights, and judging by previous experiences, the in-coming administration is advised to establish a cultural commission with a mandate to oversee these civic rights with an earmarked budget, personnel and inclusive representation centrally and provincially.

- **Provide equal opportunities in local and national media** to express regional, local, and traditional cultures and identity orientation.

- **Fund and provide schools with facilities to teach languages,** especially at the primary level as part of enriching the diversity of Sudan.

- **Fund activities which are often associated with traditional cultures** such as cultural bands, music, theatre and annual festivities in recognition of the cultural diversities of Sudan.

- **Renovate the historical sites in northern Sudan and other areas to encourage tourism to the area.** UNESCO and the International Council on Monuments and Sites can be approached for funding.

- **Respect all faiths and allow freedom of worship without harassment,** oppression or incitement of inflammatory religious speeches or edicts (*fatwas*).

- **Provide equal participation in economic sectors,** decision-making and other political activities of the state as part of reflecting local distinctiveness.

- **Review educational curricula in order to reflect all aspirations of Sudanese citizens** and not just a section of society. This will strengthen the sense of belonging, identity and upholding genuine citizenship rights. An approach aimed at increasing public education campaigns will enable open discussion of issues of diversity, tolerance and peaceful co-existence.
E.2. Constitution:

For the purposes of effecting the desired sustainable political transformation in Sudan, it is recommended that the drafting of a new constitution be guided by the following constitutional principles (CP). These principles, in addition to other established ones, are articulated to suit societies characterized by multiple diversities. Given the previous attempts at constitutional designs, a preliminary step in the drafting of the new constitution may require an analysis of previous constitutional documents from the perspective of respecting these principles. Another preliminary step would be to survey the already existing drafts for a sustainable constitution proposed by other political movements.

**CP.1** The Constitution of Sudan shall provide for the establishment of a sovereign decentralized state/based on equal citizenship and a democratic system of government committed to achieving gender, ethnic and religious equality.

**CP.2** Everyone shall enjoy all universally recognized human rights, freedoms and civil liberties, which shall be provided for and protected by entrenched and justiciable provisions in the Constitution.

**CP.3** The Constitution shall be the supreme law of the land. It shall be binding on all organs of the state at all levels of government.

**CP.4** The legal system shall ensure the equality of all before the law and an equitable legal process.

**CP.5** There shall be a separation of powers between the legislature, executive and judiciary, with appropriate checks and balances to ensure accountability, responsiveness and openness.

**CP.6** The judiciary shall be appropriately qualified, independent and impartial and shall have the power and jurisdiction to safeguard and enforce the Constitution and all rights enshrined in the Constitution.

**CP.7** There shall be representative government embracing multi-party democracy, regular elections, universal adult suffrage, a common voters' roll, and, in general, proportional representation.

**CP.8** Provision shall be made for freedom of information so that there can be open and accountable administration at all levels of government.

**CP.9** Formal legislative procedures shall be adhered to by legislative organs at all levels of government.

**CP.10** The diversity of language and culture shall be acknowledged and protected, and conditions for their promotion shall be guaranteed. All languages of Sudan are
official languages to be treated equally. The working or business conduct language at the national level is Arabic and English.

(CP.11) Collective and individual rights in forming, joining and maintaining organs of civil society, including linguistic, cultural and religious associations, shall, on the basis of non-discrimination and free association, be recognized and protected.

(CP.12) (a) The institution, status and role of traditional leadership, according to customary law, shall be recognized and protected in the Constitution. Customary law shall be recognized and applied by the courts, subject to the fundamental rights contained in the Constitution and to legislation dealing specifically therewith.

(b) Provisions in a state constitution relating to the institution, role, authority and status of a traditional administration shall be recognized and protected in the Constitution.

(CP.13) Provision shall be made for participation of all political parties in the legislative process in a manner consistent with democracy.

(CP.14) Government shall be structured at national, state and local levels.

(CP.15) At each level of government, there shall be democratic representation. This principle shall not derogate from the provisions of principle 13.

(CP.16) (a) The powers and functions of the national government and state governments and the boundaries of the states shall be defined in the Constitution.

(b) The powers and functions of the states defined in the Constitution, including the competence of a state legislature to adopt a constitution for its state, shall not be substantially less than or substantially inferior to those provided for in the Constitution.

(c) The boundaries of the states shall be the same as those established in terms of the Constitution.

(d) Amendments to the Constitution which alter the powers, boundaries, functions or institutions of the states shall in addition to any other procedures specified in the Constitution for constitutional amendments, require the approval of a special majority of the legislatures of the states. Alternatively, if there is such a chamber, a two-thirds majority of a chamber of Parliament composed of state representatives, and if the amendment concerns specific state only, the approval of the legislatures of such state will also be needed.

(e) Provisions shall be made for obtaining the views of a state legislature concerning all constitutional amendments regarding its powers, boundaries and functions.
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(CP.17) The powers and functions at the national and regional levels of government shall include exclusive powers as well as the power to perform functions for other levels of government on an agency or delegation basis.

(CP.18) Each level of government shall have appropriate and adequate legislative and executive powers and functions that will enable each level to function effectively.

The following criteria shall be applied in the allocation of powers to the national government and the state governments:

(a) Where it is necessary for the maintenance of essential national standards, for the establishment of minimum standards required for the rendering of services, the maintenance of economic unity, the maintenance of national security or the prevention of unreasonable action taken by one state which is prejudicial to the interests of another state or the country as a whole, the Constitution shall empower the national government to intervene through legislation or such other steps as may be defined in the Constitution.

(b) Where there is necessity for Sudan to speak with one voice, or to act as a single entity, in particular in relation to other states, powers should be allocated to the national government.

(c) Where uniformity across the nation is required for a particular function, the legislative power over that function should be allocated predominantly, if not wholly, to the national government.

(d) The determination of national economic policies, and the power to promote interstate commerce and to protect the common market in respect of the mobility of goods, services, capital and labor, should be allocated to the national government.

(e) State governments shall have powers exclusively.

(f) Where mutual co-operation is essential or desirable or where it is required to guarantee equality of opportunity or access to a government service, the powers should be allocated concurrently to the national government and the state governments.

(CP.19) The national government shall not exercise its powers so as to encroach upon the geographical, functional or institutional integrity of the states.

(CP.20) A framework for local government powers, functions and structures shall be set out in the Constitution. The comprehensive powers, functions and other features of local government shall be set out in parliamentary statutes or in state legislation or in both.
(CP.21) The national government and state governments shall have fiscal powers and functions which will be defined in the Constitution. The framework for local government referred to in principle 23 shall make provision for appropriate fiscal powers and functions for different categories of local government.

(CP.22) Each level of government shall have a constitutional right to an equitable share of revenue collected nationally so as to ensure that states and local governments are able to provide basic services and execute the functions allocated to them.

(CP.23) A Financial and Fiscal Commission, in which each region shall be represented, shall recommend equitable fiscal and financial allocations to the region and local governments from revenue collected nationally, after taking into account the national interest, economic disparities between the regions as well as the population and developmental needs, administrative responsibilities and other legitimate interests of each of the regions.

(CP.24) Notwithstanding the provisions of principle 12, the right of employers and employees to join and form employer organizations and trade unions and to engage in collective bargaining shall be recognized and protected. Provision shall be made that every person shall have the right to fair labor practices.

(CP.25) The independence and impartiality of a Public Service Commission, a Reserve Bank, an Auditor-General and an Ombudsman shall be provided for and safeguarded by the Constitution in the interests of the maintenance of effective public finance and administration and a high standard of professional ethics in the public service.

(CP.26) (a) There shall be an efficient, non-partisan, career-orientated public service broadly representative of the Sudanese community, functioning on a basis of fairness and which shall serve all members of the public in an unbiased and impartial manner, and shall, in the exercise of its powers and in compliance with its duties, loyally execute the lawful policies of the government of the day in the performance of its administrative functions. The structures and functioning of the public service, as well as the terms and conditions of service of its members, shall be regulated by law.

(b) Every member of the public service shall be entitled to a fair pension.

(CP.27) Every member of the military and security forces (police and intelligence), and the military and security forces as a whole, shall be required to perform their functions and exercise their powers in the national interest and shall be prohibited from furthering or prejudicing party political interest.
E.3. Socio-Economic:

- A well-informed government needs to take the lead and lay the foundations for a vibrant, competent private sector to act as an engine of development. The role of the government will consist in putting an end to all forms of marginalization, and deprivation and achieving equitable distribution of the fruits of development. A social market is an organized economy whereby lawful regulations of the free market forces aim at achieving social results. The regulatory role of the state in the social and economic fields shall be undertaken with due consideration to the above requirements.

- Regional inequality will be reduced by bringing towns to people rather than people to towns. Services will be distributed equitably across the country. This will preclude the phenomenon of slum dwellers, town informal economy, pressure of limited social services, and will also help ensure that people stay on the land so that agriculture, agro-industry and other economic opportunities can flourish.

- In the context of general policy, diversification should be encouraged to eliminate the structural deformities that have accumulated over time and reverse the Dutch diseases symptoms. This vision entails encouraging and diversifying exports from agricultural and manufacturing sectors by, among other things, ensuring a competitive real exchange to provide sound incentives to producers in the tradable goods sector to increase the domestic production of both exportable and importable goods. Establishing a competitive real exchange rate, however, prerequisites taming wild inflation by rationalizing government expenditure, and, more crucially, by revisiting the Bank of Sudan law to ensure its autonomy, to guard against turning it into a money-printing machine, and to guard against political abuse in general, as well as to ensure that fiscal policy does not dominate or undermine monetary policy.

- Environmental management will be strongly anchored on the concept of sustainable human development and peace. The focus is on equitable and rational utilization of natural resources among the citizens without jeopardizing the rights of future generations; preventing resource-based conflict and its consequences; acknowledging the rights of all citizens to a clean, safe and healthy environment; and spreading the culture of environmental rights and responsibility through the principle of preserving the integrity of the environment.

- A major effort of statistical reconciliation will also be required to understand why certain measures such as household income can move differently depending on the underlying statistical source. Quality of life depends on people’s objective conditions and capabilities. Steps should be taken to improve measures of people’s health, education, personal activities and environmental conditions. In particular, substantial effort should be devoted to developing and implementing
robust, reliable measures of social connections, political voice, and security that can be shown to predict life satisfaction.

- **A workable mechanism needs to be put in place to help bring back the human capital** that has left the country during the last decades, or at least somehow to harness its accumulated financial resources, expertise, and connection. There is a need to address capital flight and also reclaim the financial resources that have been wrongfully taken outside the country. Such a mechanism should make use of the existing legal frameworks and international asset recovery systems and initiatives already in place.

- **The land tenure system must be reformed, including government and customary laws and regulations.** In addition, legal action is to be undertaken exploring the possibility of reviewing contracts with countries as well as multinational corporations.

**E.4. Education:**

- **Restore trust in government officials.** As governance is restored, causing Sudanese to believe again in the integrity of government officials, public resources can more easily be mobilized and self-help power is expected to flare-up anew, in an unprecedented manner.

- **Increase the budget for education from total expenditures.** Inadequate governance and developmental policies are causing a misallocation of resources. Stolen public money should be recovered and this money should be properly used to fund education.

- **Launch a campaign to raise awareness about the needs of the education system and mobilize local communities, businesses, and regional and international organizations** to help raise funds and gather resources that can support what will be allocated by central and local authorities given that Sudan will start as a failed state with scarce resources. Sudanese in the Diaspora can help tremendously in securing financial and other types of support for schools. This was evidenced in the Geziera State, in which expatriates are known for contributing considerable funds for schools, electricity, water, medical clinics, etc. The media campaign must be launched immediately to bring people’s awareness to the level of the challenges that are facing education. Awareness should be elevated to the extent that individuals start to respond, as if education recovery is a personal matter.

- **Design the education system to serve national interests rather than ideological agendas.** Short term and long-term contingency plans should be prepared to eliminate the ability of government leaders to take over education for their own interests.
• **Introduce a new curriculum to include issues of liberty, equity, and democracy that correspond to the vision of a new Sudan.** The new curricular should consider that Sudan is one of the most diverse countries in the world. The profound identity crisis (i.e. Arab-Islamic anxiously implemented identity) can be overcome through revisiting history and the implementation of new curriculum for history. The civic education curriculum should include basic principals such as respecting others, coexistence, and even personal hygiene. The national committee on education will need to consider addressing educational philosophy and issues of educational policies, such as centralization and decentralization of curriculum content, educational finance, etc.

• **Limit the improper practices of private schools.** The promotional television advertisements of private schools should be banned, or at least scrutinized. Also, the practices of enticing good students to leave public schools and join private schools should be forbidden, as this practice indeed undermines the development of public schools, actually dismantling public education and replacing it with private education.

• **Support educational planning through research.** Research will be the only tool to get to the bottom of widely disseminated misconceptions surrounding the Sudanese identity. An up-to-date curriculum cannot be designed without up-to-date knowledge about the world. Developing nations should start from where the world has ended. Critical thinking and innovation are both an outcome of research and the essence of the developed world’s economy.

1. **Form a national committee of independent experts in education** to address the following:
   a. Revise the entirety of the current curriculum to identify the ideological messages embedded in the curriculum, as well as other messages that promote religious intolerance, and messages that claim the homogeneity of the Sudanese people.
   b. Evaluate the curriculum validity in terms of the knowledge and the skills it fosters and write recommendations on where to go from there regarding the development of a balanced curriculum that ensures providing current knowledge, up-to-date technical skills, and democratic values.
   c. Explore different types of curriculum models in today’s world and adapt the version that suits the conditions of the country and make any amendments necessary that make it more relevant to the needs of the diverse regions of the country.
   d. Complete the work on the curriculum before the start of the transition period.

2. **Repair the damage to teachers’ training** under the NCP rule. Plans should include the following:
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a. Form a sub-committee of higher education experts to revise the curriculum and the facilities in which the teacher preparation programs are conducted.

b. Identify ways to attract teachers. Choosing to be a teacher among the youth in Sudan is now lower than ever. The same sub-committee dealing with the teachers’ training issue should also look into the means that could make the teaching profession attractive to university students. (Revisiting the experience of Omdurman’s Teachers’ Higher Institute in the 1960s may be helpful.)

3. **Link education to local needs.** In a country that witnessed mass-exodus migration from rural areas to urban areas, the issue of linking education to the daily living needs of the local population becomes vital. Education has to take a leading role in making the rural areas livable and able to retain its local population, man-power and intellectual capital, and restore people’s declining sense of attachment to their land. Foster technical education and work, and increase investments and technical inputs to improve the quality (not only quantity) of health science training and education in both the public and private educational/training institutions. Furthermore, mobile schools should be designed to help nomadic people move freely and yet have the level of education required.

4. **Involve local communities.** Dictatorial regimes, especially the religiously driven ones, tend to impose policies from above claiming that “they know better.” Experts, similarly, may also fall into the problem of coming from above. Plans need to be drafted to ensure involvement of local communities, from the beginning, in the process of recovering the education system and determining how it should be run. In other words, it is crucial that the local populations feel a sense of ownership of what is to be done in their areas.

5. **Form a sub-committee to evaluate existing school facilities.** Facilities and furniture are now quite inadequate. Schooling in many areas is performed under the trees. School buildings have to meet, at least, the minimum standards that ensure students’ safety and allow a reasonable atmosphere for effective instruction. The sub-committee must explore the condition of buildings and furniture throughout the country. It is important to rely at the beginning on local materials and handymen, such as carpenters, straw-bale builders, metal smiths, welders, etc. to improve the current conditions of the facilities, until permanent buildings and modern furniture become affordable.

6. **Provide meals for students at school.** Malnourishment is one of the factors that hinder children’s ability to learn. Children at the primary education level must have at least one meal at school. Sustaining such expenditure is not an easy endeavor in Sudan’s current conditions, but
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this must be explored, especially if plans include turning schools partially into food producing units for milk, poultry and vegetables. It is suggested that the vocational aspect of education in rural areas should be linked from the beginning to food production and the general betterment of the quality of life.

E.5. Health:

- **Redistribute resources according to the health sector’s priorities.** At least 10% of government expenditure should be allocated to the health sector. Based on a proper review of Sudan’s HRH situation, assets should be redistributed from existing medical schools to core public medical schools and to strengthen investment in allied health sciences.

- **Plan to the implementation of a Basic Service Package (BSP)** to be delivered to all Sudanese citizens, including internally displaced populations, and migrants living in Sudan through public sector outlets of all levels (primary, secondary, and tertiary).

- **Provide health care insurance for government employees.** Service delivery in Sudan should be planned and studied to reach all citizens, refugees and internally displaced persons. Until national insurance coverage is attained, the essential emergency, accident, and resuscitation services are to be rehabilitated.

- **Intensity school health education and services,** including basic hygiene/sanitation, vaccination, nutrition, deworming, eye health, dental health, healthy dietary intake, lifestyle improvement, psychosocial/mental health interventions, and sexual and reproductive health interventions.

- **Comply with global aid effectiveness measures** by engaging all stakeholders (autonomous managers, donors, international organizations, etc.) to ensure streamlining of all major health projects (e.g. polio, malaria, HIV/AIDS, bilharzia and TB, etc.), so that they are (a) harmonized among one another, (b) aligned with national Sudanese policy and strategy priorities, and (c) gradually integrated to operate through the public sector and to strengthen existing health systems. This can also induce seeking technical and financial support from suitable countries, donors and the UN.

In the **medium term,** the following policies are proposed:

- **Develop a comprehensive National Health Policy,** along with a Strategy and Implementation Plan to guide the health sector development and performance in Sudan, endorsing a national understanding that health is a right.

- **Develop, place and implement Primary Health Care** as the central part of the health sector’s strategy.
• Develop a well-established patient referral system.

• Reduce the incidence of chronic non-communicable diseases by identifying key risk factors relevant to Sudan (including exposure to carcinogens from industrial waste, pesticide use and other exposures) and actively addressing them, including through stronger anti-tobacco measures, lowering salt intake, and actively promoting healthier lifestyles.

• Improve chronic disease management and support, including through palliative and home-based care delivery systems, early detection and prevention programs for cancer, diabetes, hypertension, and other non-communicable diseases, etc.

• Develop a broad and robust partnership between government and the private sector in a relationship which is based upon mutual-respect, mutual-benefit, shared visions, and formal agreements. This should seek to leverage not just the private sector’s financial contribution but the added value it can bring in a range of health sector areas such as deepening the reach of health services, better exploiting modern technologies, as well as taking calculated risks to innovate in support of health.

• Institute a research-based health policy informed by an efficient statistical arm across all delivery levels and integrated with the national economic and demographic databases.

• Introduce regulations to monitor and curb the current mushrooming of private medical institutions, a hot spot of capital accumulation, but mostly of lame and substandard ethical and professional performance.

In the long-term the following policies are proposed:

• Implement a developed health policy.

• Roll out the developed and tested components of piloted HRH, HCF and other components.

• Develop and implement performance-based funding by the MOH towards sub-national elements of the health system, using models implemented successfully in Rwanda, Ethiopia and elsewhere; including features that enable local health facilities to benefit from tax and other revenue raised by the local government in which they are located.

• Restore the rural health service policy and improve its ability to redistribute, support and retain appropriate types, mixes, and numbers of health workers in under-served areas and populations throughout the country.
E.6. Foreign Relations:

- Re-orient foreign relations of Sudan to serve the interests of the people of Sudan rather than special interest groups and certain ideologies.

- Award South Sudan preferential status and special attention in Sudan’s regional and international relations based on the Framework Agreement of 13 March 2012, whereby the citizens of the two countries enjoy the Four Freedoms of movement, residence, work, and property ownership. The final aim is to establish strategic relations that could be a confederal system or any type of union that would not undermine the full independence and sovereignty of both countries through:
  1) creating a sort of union between them with a common market, unified currency, and adoption of a dual nationality system;
  2) the creation of an initial understanding for the promotion of policies that are based on mutual respect and non-interference in each other’s affairs;
  3) the exchange of ideas based on democracy, justice, equality and freedom for all peoples in both nations;
  4) finding lasting solutions to the outstanding issues such as debts, the border, oil, Nile water, security arrangements, etc.;
  5) the adoption of a mutually agreed upon system that allows seasonal migration of herders and their cattle crossing international borders without hindrance;
  6) the creation of a joint commission to meet regularly to coordinate the policies of the state vis-à-vis the neighboring countries; and
  7) the assistance of Sudanese to South Sudan in the fields where expertise is needed especially in the fields of education, human and animal health, banking, insurance, etc.

The relations between the Sudans, north and south, are very unique. Despite its historical complexities, it is a relationship that is bound by history, culture, and socio-economic and political strategic interests. It is to be recalled that the two countries share the longest international border among themselves compared to any other country bordering them in the region. This border is shaped with the interests of many communities from both sides. The two countries were one country for more than 100 hundred years, which makes it different in comparison to other neighboring countries in the region. The political classes in both countries have known each other in different circumstances, including many of them have attended school together and worked in the same institutions at certain points of time. The socio-economic benefits for both countries out of this relationship are strategic. This relationship also has a lot of liabilities and disagreements on many different outstanding issues, including border demarcations and the economy. Yet, the relations between the two countries can only be strategic. This will require the respect of sovereignty and independence of both countries, and a clear plan to create two independent viable states and to allow free movements of peoples and goods and to enter into constructive partnerships that will utilize human and material resources for
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the benefit of both countries. This will also require opening up, from both countries, to create regional integration with other countries in the region with the aim of creating a bigger bloc. If European countries, despite their might, need a European Union, why not the two Sudans and the region. The two countries can create a model of cooperation and integration in the continent, between two different independent states.

- **Implement structural changes at the level of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs** to facilitate a new foreign policy. Logistically, the MFA will need fundamental rehabilitation and reorganization, with specialized training of its diplomats and supporting staff to reflect ethnic and gender diversity of the country. Recruitment should be based on academic qualifications, experience and personal conduct.

- **Base diplomatic missions abroad on the national interests of Sudan.**

- **Pay special attention to the relationship with the Horn of Africa, and East African and the Great Lakes states.**

- **Adopt a strategic relationship and a constructive partnership with Egypt** as part of a regional integration approach that will further the strategic interests of Sudan and the continent and will resolve historical border issues, including Hala’ib Triangle, Wadi Halfa enclave and other areas, in accordance with historical realities and international law.

- **Proactively engage with African regional organizations**, which are important elements in establishing peace and development in Africa.

- **Establish a foreign policy towards Arab countries** that forges genuine relationships in economic development and social and political spheres that safeguards the interests of Sudanese working abroad and that fights the political Islam agenda, especially establishing a constructive partnership with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) member states.

- **Normalize relations with the EU and the USA** to rehabilitate Sudan as a member of the community of nations and to promote world peace and security. The relations with the Asian and Latin American states will focus on learning from their development achievements, while relations with Russia and some of the Eastern European countries, as well as China, should move away from an emphasis on the military.

- **Normalize the position of Sudan in relation to international development organizations and financial institution** for access to resources and to facilitate the process of debt relief.

- **Work with international humanitarian aid organizations** to address issues of refugees and internally displaced people (IDPs).
• **Dissolve the Authority of Sudanese Working Abroad** and reallocate appropriately its functions to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

• **Dismantle the Popular Council of Friendship** and reallocate its functions to the MFA and Ministry of Youth appropriately.

**E.7. Security:**

• **Restructure security forces.** As noted, a major defining feature of a modern state is its monopoly over the use of force to provide overall security to its citizens and to ensure the equitable enforcement of the rule of law. The absence of this feature defines fragile or failed states. After 28 years of Islamic rule, the security organs are partisan and ideological. Two major groups bearing arms in the country can be identified: government forces and its militias and armed struggle forces. Fundamental restructuring and a new security arrangement are needed.

• **Declare an immediate, comprehensive and monitored ceasefire.** In the short-run, the security-responsible bodies should declare an immediate monitored ceasefire. It will be observed by all parties, and a Joint Command and the necessary different mechanisms will be set in place to take charge of the security situation during the transitional period.

**Transitional Security Arrangements**

• **Restructure NISS immediately at the beginning of the transitional period,** including the removal of political appointees within its rank and file. NISS will have no executive power, but rather, its task will be limited to the collection and analysis of information to advise the executive. NISS will be a professional security force in order to end the politicization within its rank and file.

• **Restructure the police force to retain its civil nature as a regular force.**

• **Restrict the status of SAF and the armed opposition forces** in the short term transitional period as follows:
  1) All government militias and armed forces allied to SAF shall be immediately disbanded.
  2) The SAF and the forces of the armed struggle shall remain in their respective places during the transitional period and both forces shall be considered and treated equally as Sudan national armed forces during the transitional period.
  3) The disbanded militias and the two constitutional armed forces from SAF and the opposition armed struggle forces will undergo a process of Demobilization, Disarmament and Re-integration (DDR). The government will avail adequate resources in order for re-integration to include
educational and employment services to address the crisis facing the youth in particular.

- **Identify the composition of the armed forces:**
  1. Sudan Armed Forces
  2. Forces of the Armed Struggle (SRF, SPLA-N)
  3. Joint Integrated Unites (JIU)

- **Create Joint Integrated Units with a new military doctrine** to reflect the interest and the diversity of the Sudanese society. The JIU model has the opportunity to resolve the current impasse on the need to have a new unified army especially as the marginalized groups are looking for a new united Sudan with a new security arrangement.

  A new military doctrine would reflect the commonality of the Sudanese people and their interests. The professional nature of the JIU should be agreed upon, not only in the transitional period, but also should be developed over a longer period for the creation of the new Sudanese unified army out of the JIUs process.

  1. The JIU should constitute the nucleus of the new Sudanese army.
  2. Selection for the JIUs should be based on professional standard requirements.
  3. The JIU should be balanced in number between SAF and the forces of the armed struggle.
  4. The JIU will be a symbol of national unity during the transitional period.
  5. The JIU will be a symbol of sovereignty during the transitional period.
  6. The JIU will participate in the defense of the country together with the two forces.
  7. The JIU will be involved in the protection of the VIP during the transitional period.
  8. The JIU will be involved in the reconstruction of the country.

- **Develop national security and contingency plans.** High to extreme levels of man-made threats, which are triggered by either political or criminal motivations, are most likely to generate risks of severe impact if not adequately and timely addressed. Therefore, the political leadership must ascertain that a complete set of national security and contingency plans are carefully developed, rehearsed and maintained as early as possible.

**Longer Term Security Arrangements**

- **Basic Principles**
  1. The new national security arrangement should reflect the diversity and the interest of the Sudanese people.
  2. The new national security arrangement should protect the nation and the new permanent constitution.
3) The new unified Sudan army will have a new military doctrine which has been developed within the process of the JIU$s$.

- **Territorial Force**
  The armed struggle component of the security arrangement during the transitional period will wither away together with SAF and pave the way for the permanent new Sudanese army; nevertheless, the marginalized areas where the armed struggle has taken place will require a guarantee for the experience of the past not to repeat itself. Therefore, a territorial force shall provide permanently this guarantee as well as it can help at the national level if need arises.