{"id":20106331,"date":"2024-11-07T08:00:00","date_gmt":"2024-11-07T07:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.dabangasudan.org\/?p=20106331"},"modified":"2024-11-07T14:55:48","modified_gmt":"2024-11-07T13:55:48","slug":"op-ed-how-will-trumps-return-to-the-white-house-impact-sudan","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.dabangasudan.org\/en\/all-news\/article\/op-ed-how-will-trumps-return-to-the-white-house-impact-sudan","title":{"rendered":"How will Trump\u2019s return to the White House impact Sudan?"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

By Abdel Moneim Sheikh Idris<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

With Donald Trump set to return to the White House following his victory in the US elections on November 5, questions are being raised about how his administration will guide relations with Sudan, especially in light of his \u201cAmerica First\u201d policy that he has pledged to his constituents to adopt.<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Although Trump did not specifically refer to Sudan during his last election campaign, his moves in his first term give a glimpse of his potential path towards Sudan, relying on orientations that serve direct American interests.<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u201cAmerica First\u201d policy and Trump\u2019s regional orientation<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

As Trump has repeatedly declared in his speeches, particularly on his election campaign, that during his first presidency, his policy was based on the principle of \u201cAmerica First\u201d and avoiding unnecessary external interference. He stated that \u201crebuilding America comes first\u201d and focuses on achieving direct economic and political gains without incurring additional burdens. In this sense, the future Trump administration may seek to cooperate with Sudan, but only within limits that serve US interests.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Abraham Accords<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Within the framework of the Abraham Accords<\/a>, the Trump administration encouraged Sudan in 2020 to normalise relations with Israel, a move aimed at strengthening regional cooperation according to the American vision and distancing Sudan from the Iranian axis.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The normalisation steps included removing Sudan from the list of State Sponsors of Terrorism<\/a> and providing economic facilities.Trump stated at the time that these agreements \u201cchange the face of the Middle East,\u201d pointing to their role in building a regional cooperation network that includes Sudan, Israel and several other Arab countries.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Trump is expected to refocus on these agreements as a way to promote regional stability that serves US interests. It may support Sudan economically, but it is likely to rely more on private investment than direct aid in its foreign relations.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Attitude towards Chinese and Russian influence<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Despite the \u201cAmerica First\u201d policy, it is necessary for America, according to Trump\u2019s vision, to monitor Chinese and Russian influence in Africa, including Sudan. During his first term, Trump showed interest in countering Chinese and Russian moves around the world. Russia plans to build a naval base in Sudan, a move that worries the United States about increasing Russian influence in the Red Sea.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

But instead of direct military engagement, Trump is expected to rely on regional allies, such as the UAE and Israel, to support Sudan\u2019s stability and contain foreign influence, in line with his policy of relying on regional alliances to reduce the military burden on the United States.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The bottom line<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Trump administration\u2019s future relationship with Sudan is likely to be limited and serve US interests, relying on regional agreements and the private sector to stabilise the region.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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Background on Sudan-US relations<\/em><\/strong>:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

After a distinct thaw in US-Sudan relations following the overthrow of the Al Bashir regime and a movement toward democratic transition, relations between Washington and Khartoum have been strained following the subsequent the military coup d\u2019\u00e9tat<\/a> of October 2021. The past two years especially, have seen raft of sanctions<\/a> imposed by the USA on individual protagonists in the Sudan war. On June 1, 2023, the US Treasury Department imposed sanctions<\/a> on four companies affiliated with the SAF and the RSF.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The USA suspended all aid to Sudan following the coup, saying that \u201cthe United States is pausing assistance from the $700 million in emergency assistance appropriations of Economic Support Funds for Sudan. Those funds were intended to support the country\u2019s democratic transition as we evaluate the next step for Sudan programming.\u201d<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

On May 11, 2022, the US Senate passed a draft resolution<\/a> \u201dto condemn the military coup in Sudan and support the Sudanese people,\u201d and the House of Commons also unanimously passed the non-binding resolution with a quick vote without any objections.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

On March 23 2022, the US Senate\u2019s Foreign Relations Committee unanimously approved a draft resolution condemning the military coup in Sudan and calling on the US administration to impose sanctions on those responsible for the coup.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The draft resolution came two days after the US Treasury imposed sanctions<\/a> on the paramilitary Central Reserve Forces (popularly called Abu Tira) that stand under the command of the police, in accordance with the Global Magnitsky Act<\/a>* on serious violations of human rights.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Treasury listed the excessively violent repression of peaceful pro-democracy protests by the security forces as the main reason.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

There have been wide calls for targeted US sanctions<\/a> on the Chairman of Sudan\u2019s Sovereignty Council Gen Abdelfattah El Burhan and deputy Chairman Mohamed \u2018Hemeti\u2019 Dagalo for their involvement in serious human rights abuses following the coup.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

In March, the US Department of the Treasury\u2019s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) announced sanctions on the Sudan Central Reserve Police<\/a>  for serious human rights abuse yesterday. The Treasury listed the excessively violent repression of peaceful pro-democracy protests by the security forces as the main reason.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

In May, the US Department of the Treasury\u2019s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) announced sanctions against \u2018Sudan companies with links to Hamas<\/a>\u2019, with one financier, Hisham Younis Yahia Qafisheh, allegedly \u201coperating and managing at least two Sudan-based companies, Agrogate Holding and Al Rowad Real Estate Development, in order to generate revenue for the Palestinian group.\u201d<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Bilateral agreement<\/em><\/strong><\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

In November 2020, Sudan and the US signed a bilateral claims settlement<\/a> to resolve \u201cdefault judgements and claims based on allegations that Sudan\u2019s prior regime supported acts of terrorism\u201d. According to the agreement, Sudan had to pay $335 million, on top of approximately $72 million already paid, for distribution to victims of terrorism.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Sudan\u2019s removal from the SST list, decreed in the dying days of the Donald Trump administration, was conditional on a bilateral claims settlement<\/a> signed in November 2020 to resolve \u201cdefault judgements and claims based on allegations that Sudan\u2019s prior regime supported acts of terrorism\u201d. Sudan had to pay $335 million, on top of approximately $72 million already paid, for distribution to victims of terrorism.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

In exchange, after payment of compensation to the families of the victims of the bombing of the destroyer USS Cole in Yemen<\/a> in 2000, and the 1998 bombing of the US embassies in Dar El Salaam in Tanzania and Nairobi in Kenya<\/a>, the default judgments and claims against Sudan in US courts would be dismissed, and Sudan\u2019s sovereign immunities under US law would be restored to those enjoyed by countries that have never been designated by the US as a State Sponsor of Terrorism (SST).<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

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*The Global Magnitsky Act of 2016 authorises the US government to sanction foreign government officials worldwide who are deemed to be human rights offenders. Sanctions can include freezing their assets and banning them from entering the USA.<\/em><\/p>\n